Statutory interpretation. The Georgia Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Act must be construed broadly and its exemptions narrowly. See Kilgore v. R.W. Page Corp., 261 Ga. 410, 405 S.E.2d 655 (1991) (the Act "must be broadly construed to effect its purpose of protecting the public and individuals from closed-door meetings"); Atlanta Journal v. Hill, 257 Ga. 398, 359 S.E.2d 913 (1987) (same); Crosland v. Butts County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 214 Ga. App. 295, 448 S.E.2d 454 (1994) (Open Meetings Act will be interpreted to protect the public and individuals from closed-door meetings). Cf. Steele v. Honea, 261 Ga. 644, 647, 409 S.E.2d 652 (1991) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (because violation of the Act may be grounds for recall from office, "if there is the slightest doubt, or any question whatsoever, as to whether a matter can be the subject of a closed meeting, DO NOT CLOSE").