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Libel: FaultAll plaintiffs must demonstrate that the news organization was at fault in some way. The Supreme Court has recognized different standards for different types of libel plaintiffs, with public officials and public figures required to show the highest degree of fault. Celebrities and others with power in a community usually are considered public figures. Politicians and high-ranking government personnel are public officials, as are public employees who have substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. Some courts have found that public school teachers and police officers also are public officials. But determining if other people are private or public figures is not always easy. In some instances, private and public categories may overlap. For example, a businessperson who has high visibility because of fundraising efforts in a community may not be a public figure for purposes other than the individual's community activity, but not necessarily for all purposes. A plaintiff who is considered a public figure or official has a higher standard of proof in a libel case than a private plaintiff. The public figure or official must prove that the publisher or broadcaster acted with "actual malice" in reporting derogatory information. "Actual malice," in libel parlance, does not mean ill will or intent to harm. Instead, it means the defendant knew that the challenged statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. In determining whether actual malice exists, a court may examine a reporter's newsgathering techniques. Although carelessness is not usually considered reckless disregard, ignoring obvious methods of substantiating allegations could be considered reckless. In Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,9 the Supreme Court held that even an extreme deviation from professional standards, or the publication of a story to increase circulation, do not in themselves prove actual malice. The Court also said that while failure to investigate facts does not necessarily prove actual malice, a "purposeful avoidance of the truth" may. Edited quotations that are not verbatim will not necessarily demonstrate actual malice as long as the alterations do not materially change the meaning of the words the speaker used. In Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine,10 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that some editing of quotations is often necessary, but refused to grant blanket protection to all edits that are "rational" interpretations of what the speaker said. If the plaintiff is a private litigant, he or she must at least prove that the publisher or broadcaster was negligent in failing to ascertain that the statement was false and defamatory. Some states may impose a higher burden on private-figure litigants, especially if the story in question concerns a matter of public importance.11
Notes 9. Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). 10. Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991). 11. States that require proof of malice for private figure plaintiffs are Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana and New Jersey. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press © 2003 RCFP. 1815 N. Fort Myer Dr., Suite 900, Arlington VA 22209 (703) 807-2100 |