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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES LISSNER,
v.
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE,
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HONORABLE AUDREY B. COLLINS
CV 98-7438-ABC (ANx)
Gregg P. Leslie
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................................ii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.......................................................................1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE...................................................................2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.........................................................................3
ARGUMENT.....................................................................................................4
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................23 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO CIRCUIT RULE 32(e)(4)......................24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454 (1987)......................................................................13 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)............................13 Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976)...............4, 10, 17 Dobronski v. Federal Communications Commission, 17 F.3d 275 (9th Cir. 1994)............................................................21-22 Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F.Supp. 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1981)..........18 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973)................................................13 FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975)......................................14 Hunt v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 972 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1992).........................................................21- 22 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1976)........4 Lissner v. U.S. Customs Service, No. CV 98-7438-ABC, slip op. at 12 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 1999).......................................13, 19, 23 Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985)..............................13 North Haven Bd. Of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).............15 O'Kane v. United States Customs Service, 163 F. 3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1999).....................................................16 Providence Journal Co. v. United States Department of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 568 (1st Cir. 1992)........18 Rosenfeld v. United States Department of Justice, 57 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 S.Ct. 833 (1996)..................18, 20 United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487 (1994)......................................................................11, 12, 15 United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)............................3, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24 United States Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)..............................................................4 Voinche v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 940 F.Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1996)....................................................16
STATUTES Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act), 5 U.S.C.§ 552...............4 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b).........................................................................4 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1).....................................................................13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3).....................................................................14 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6).....................................................................11, 12, 22 5. U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(c)................................................................4, 9, 10, 17, 18, 22, 23 19 U.S.C. § 1459...........................................................................20 21 U.S.C. § 952.............................................................................20 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(4)....................................................................20 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3048 (Oct. 2, 1996)...............................12 LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-502), Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents (Joint Comm. Print 1975)..........................................16 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source Book: Legislative Materials, Cases, Articles (Comm. Print 1974).........16 Hearings on Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act Before Subcomm. of the Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of Clark Mollenhoff, Washington Bureau Chief of The Des Moines Register)...........................................................................7 Hearings on Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act Before Subcomm. of the Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of J.R. Wiggins, publisher of the Ellsworth-American, Ellsworth, Maine)..........................................................................8 Hearings on Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act Before Subcomm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., (1981) (statement of Jack Anderson, Mutual Broadcasting)..........................................7 Hearings on Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act Before the Subcomm. on Government Reform and Oversight on Government Management, Information and Technology, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997) (statement of Eileen Welsome, Albuquerque Tribune)................9 Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Revision Public Information Provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 895 (1966)............................................................................................5 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974)............................................14 H.R. Rep. No. 94-880, at 23 (1976)..............................................14 S. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974)................................................14 S. Rep. No. 272, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1996) (Additional Views of Senator Leahy)...........................................................................................16 S. Rep. No. 272, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1996) (Supplemental Discussion of the Bill).........................................................................................15 LAW REVIEW ARTICLES Martin E. Halstuk, Blurred Vision: How Supreme Court FOIA Opinions on Invasion of Privacy Have Missed the Target of Legislative Intent, 4 Comm. L. & Pol'y 111 (Winter 1999)..............................................................5, 6 OTHER Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822., Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, vol. III, 276 (Philip R. Fendall, ed., 1865)................................................5
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Amicus respectfully submits this brief urging reversal. The district court erred when it disregarded a 1996 Congressional mandate that Freedom of Information Act requests may be made for any public or private purpose, not just ones that are intended to shine a light on the inner workings of government. Accepted norms of legislative interpretation require this court to overturn the lower court's denial of plaintiff's record request. In June 1998, James Lissner requested under the FOI Act information from the U.S. Customs Service about the agency's arrest and punishment of two Hermosa Beach, Cal., police officers for illegally importing steroids into the United States. The Customs Service denied the request, explaining that an exemption to the FOI Act protected the records because release would violate the officers' personal privacy and would not benefit the public interest. In upholding the denial, the lower court incorrectly interpreted the FOI Act and its recent Amendments. Furthermore, the public has a keen interest in knowing about the Customs Service's policies in general and its action in this case in particular.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is a voluntary, unincorporated association of news reporters and editors dedicated to protecting the First Amendment interests and access rights of the news media. The Reporters Committee has provided information, representation, legal guidance and research in almost all significant federal and state appellate press-freedom cases since 1972. As a special project, the Reporters Committee sponsors the Freedom of Information Service Center, which advises reporters on issues of access to government records and proceedings. The news media depend on the Freedom of Information Act to obtain primary information from federal agencies and to report about government activity to their readers. Journalistic principles demand that government statements not be accepted at face value. Journalists, therefore, rely on the FOI Act to obtain primary sources of information and to receive viewpoints independent of government control. Amicus offers its 30 years worth of FOI Act experience.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The 1996 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act reaffirm Congress' intent that the FOI Act may be used for any purpose, public or private. The legislative histories of the Act and Amendments make it clear that Congress rejected the Supreme Court's overly restrictive "central purpose" test, as articulated in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989). That test is in opposition to Congress' stated goal for the FOI Act: broad agency disclosure. The public interest is served in many ways by FOI Act disclosures, not only by the release of records that directly shed light on agency action. The district court improperly applied the "central purpose" standard, finding unpersuasive the legislative history against it. Amicus asks this court to reverse.
ARGUMENT I. The 1996 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act supercede the Supreme Court's ruling in Reporters Committee by reaffirming Congress' vision of broad access under the original act
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act), 5 U.S.C.§ 552. The purpose of this landmark law was to establish "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure." Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976) (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965)). While placing a premium on public access to government information, the law recognizes nine exemptions that allow the government to withhold information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b). The exemptions are to be narrowly construed, John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1976); (quoting) Rose, 425 U.S., at 366, with "a strong presumption in favor of disclosure [that] places the burden on the agency to justify withholding any requested documents." United States Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). The scope of Exemption 7(c), which pertains to law-enforcement records, is at issue in this case. Since its inception, the FOI Act has been an invaluable resource to journalists and the public, providing both with the access to primary source material necessary to scrutinize government action. Citizen oversight of government is a cornerstone of our democratic principles and has been recognized as such since the founding of the republic. As James Madison wrote more than 200 years ago:
In the wake of World War II, at the dawn of the nuclear age and with concerns of secrecy for the new technology, Congress passed the first government access law, the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. But that law became known more as a secrecy law than an access law. Of particular note are the policy of the U.S. Postmaster General in the late 1950s not to release the names and salaries of government employees and the National Science Foundation's decision in 1962 not to release information about all of the bidders for a government contract. Fed up with what he viewed as the government's culture of secrecy, Congressman John E. Moss, who as chairman of the Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations held numerous hearings on the need for a stronger access law, was instrumental in the creation of the FOI Act. But he was not alone in recognizing the need for a strong law providing access to government information. In signing the FOI Act into law July 4, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson said:
Journalists and others have long viewed the FOI Act as an instrument that is essential to carrying out their mission of informing the public. The FOI Act has allowed journalists -- and the public -- to learn not only about myriad political scandals and coverups, but also to make use of the vast information resources held by the federal government:
Statement of Jack Anderson, Mutual Broadcasting, Subcommittee on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., July 14, 1981. Numerous times journalists have testified before Congress on the various amendments to the original act, all in hopes of securing broader rights of access and attempting to make the FOI Act more responsive to their and the public's need for information:
Clark Mollenhoff, Washington Bureau Chief of The Des Moines Register, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., May 2, 1973.Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of J.R. Wiggins, publisher of the Ellsworth-American, Ellsworth, Maine). Journalists use the FOI Act every day to uncover stories that otherwise would remain hidden in the recesses of government files. For example, the Albuquerque Tribune used the FOI Act earlier this decade to uncover evidence of secret radioactive testing the United States government conducted on its citizens during the Cold War. And this year, The Detroit Free Press used the FOI Act to help uncover some of the 10,000 documents used in an eight-month long investigation into outbreaks of deadly food poisoning that originated at a meat-packing plant and killed at least 21 people. Perhaps more importantly, the FOI Act allows ordinary citizens the chance to inspect government documents and to become informed about political issues or public programs. The right of access to government records goes hand in hand with a free press and an informed citizenry, and anything short of broad access to information is an affront to both. The public interest is best served through broad access to government information.
In 1989, the Supreme Court dealt a blow to the FOI Act's underlying policy of openness with a decision that expanded the scope of the FOI Act's Exemption 7(c) and further limited access to law-enforcement records. United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989). Exemption 7(c) prevents the release of law-enforcement records if the release "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5. U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c). This determination requires a balancing test: The information should be released if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest in keeping the information secret. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 372. In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court decided that the public interest must focus on whether the release of information would "'open agency action to the light of public scrutiny,' rather than on the particular purpose for which the document is being requested." Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772 ((quoting) Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S., at 372). Instead of the broad presumption in favor of disclosure, as Congress had intended, the Supreme Court reversed the presumption to one in favor of secrecy.Reporters Committee, 489 U.S., at 774. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens articulated what has become known as the "central purpose" test: "[T]he FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed." Reporters Committee, 489 U.S., at 774. Requiring FOI Act requests to meet this "central purpose" test is in opposition to the law's stated goal of "broad disclosure." And as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in a later case, discussed below, "The Reporters Committee 'core purpose' limitation is not found in FOIA's language." United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487, 507 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In Reporters Committee, a journalist had sought the criminal histories of four people suspected of being involved in organized crime and who had links to a corrupt United States congressman. In finding that the records at issue did not satisfy the "core purpose" test, the Supreme Court explained that the records were innately personal and would not "shed light" on the actions of government. The Supreme Court also used that test in withholding records under Exemption 6, the privacy exemption to the FOI Act, when it upheld the denial of a request by a union for the names and addresses of certain government employees in United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487 (1994). Again, the Supreme Court said that such records would invade the privacy of the workers while not informing the public about the operation of the government. Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S., at 500. Congress sought to remedy the outcomes in these decisions by reaffirming its original vision for the FOI Act through enactment of the Freedom of Information Amendments of 1996 (1996 Amendments). In addition to updating the FOI Act to reflect an era when more and more government documents are generated and stored electronically, the 1996 Amendments clarify Congress' intent that a FOI Act request may be made for "any" purpose. The Findings section of the 1996 Amendments states that the purpose of the FOI Act is to "establish ... the right of any person to obtain access to [agency records] ... for any public or private purpose." Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3048 (Oct. 2, 1996) (emphasis added). This constitutes explicit recognition by Congress that an FOI Act request may be made for "any purpose." By rejecting long-standing principles of judicial interpretation and statutory construction -- and by failing to give effect to the "any public or private purpose" language in the Findings sections of the 1996 Amendments -- the district court in this case erred. Lissner v. U.S. Customs Service, No. CV 98-7438-ABC, slip op. at 12 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 1999). Judicial interpretation of a statute may not inquire beyond the plain meaning of the statute's language. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454,461 (1987). Furthermore, all of a law's provisions are to be given effect. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) ((quoting) Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)). This is not the first time Congress has clarified its vision of the law after a Supreme Court interpretation of an FOI Act provision. In two earlier instances, Congress has amended the FOI Act in response to Supreme Court decisions. In 1974, Congress revised Exemption 1, which protects documents for national-security reasons, in response to a Supreme Court decision, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), that held classified documents were not subject to judicial review. The exemption now allows for limited judicial review. The Supreme Court's ruling in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), prompted Congress to modify Exemption 3 and to make clear its judgment that agencies should have limited discretion to deny requested documents. There should be no doubt, under the Findings section of the 1996 Amendments, that FOI Act requests that do not immediately open government operations to public scrutiny may indeed serve the public interest. The legislative history of the 1996 Amendments resolves the issue unequivocally. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1996 Amendments states that the Findings section of the 1996 Amendments was intended to overcome the Supreme Court's presumption in Reporters Committee that no public interest existed in FOI Act requests that do not seek to shed light on government operations. S. Rep. No. 272, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1996) (Additional Views of Senator Leahy). Senator Patrick Leahy was a primary sponsor of the bill in the 104th Congress and a member of the committee reporting on the bill. His views, which are uncontradicted in the body of the report, should be given considerable weight. North Haven Bd. Of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526 (1982) (remarks of a "sponsor of the language ultimately enacted ... are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction"). In the Senate Report, Senator Leahy explained the rationale for the Findings section as follows:
S. Rep. No. 272, 104th Cong., at 26-27 (1996) (Supplemental Discussion of the Bill). The federal courts that have addressed the issue of whether the 1996 Amendments supercede the Reporters Committee decision have reached different results. But the legislative intent is clear and should be controlling. The only portions of the legislative history that address the issue support the conclusion that the 1996 Amendments were intended to establish that disclosure for any purpose may serve the public interest. It should be noted that the legislative history of the original FOI Act provides no support for the Supreme Court's interpretation that Congress intended the public interest to be limited to shedding light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties. Both the sponsor of the bill that became the 1996 Amendments and the committee that added the Findings section to the bill indicated that the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee "analyzed the purpose of the FOI Act too narrowly." S. Rep. No. 272 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1996) (Additional Views of Senator Leahy). That history is authoritative. II. Even under the Reporters Committee standard, the U.S. Customs Service records Lissner requested should be made public
The U.S. Customs Service records that Lissner has requested do not involve private information that is protected under the FOI Act's Exemption 7(c). In this case, Lissner requested only background information concerning the arrest of the two police officers. He did not seek personal information about either:
Lissner Decl. Exch. 6. If the requested records do not contain personal information, whether on their face or after redaction, then the government may not deny the request under Exemption 7(c) and the records must be released. See e.g., Reporters Committee, 489 U.S., at 768. (approving the approach taken in Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976), where releasing records with the personal information redacted was preferable to an outright prohibition on the release of the records). That is not to say that the release of personal, identifying information is never allowed under Exemption 7(c), either. In Rosenfeld v. United States Department of Justice, the Ninth Circuit found that the "central purpose" of the FOI Act could not be served without releasing information about a particular individual. "[T]he public interest in this case may not be served without disclosing the names of the investigation subjects ... Therefore, disclosing the names of investigation subjects promotes the public interest of this FOI Act request." 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 S.Ct. 833 (1996) It also must be noted that, because of their jobs in the public sector, public employees who break the law should not have as great an interest in privacy as an otherwise private citizen would. See e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. United States Department of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 568 (1st Cir. 1992) (a "government employee investigated for criminal misfeasance relating to the performance of official duties generally possesses a diminished privacy interest."); see also Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F.Supp. 1059, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[P]ersons who choose to serve as public officials have given up a right to privacy insofar as they engage in misconduct or questionable activities ..."). The two police officers, by the very nature of their public employment and their sworn duty to uphold the law, have a reduced right to privacy for matters involving wrongdoing. Lissner also did not request personal information about agents and officials of the U.S. Customs Service. He limited his requests to information about the underlying crimes and the agency's handling of them: whether the drugs were imported in a vehicle or by foot, how the Customs Service learned of the illegal activities, the type and quantity of contraband seized. Lissner Decl. Exch. 6. Release of this information clearly would not violate the privacy rights of the Customs Service agents involved in the seizure. The district court did not address this issue. Lissner v. United States Customs Service, No. CV 98-7438-ABC, slip op. (C.D. Cal. June 17, 1999). Because the privacy interests of the two police officers are minimal -- and that of Customs Service officials not even an issue -- the records requested by Lissner do not deserve protection under Exemption 7(c).
Under a Reporters Committee analysis, the only cognizable public interest to support an FOI Act request is that the requested documents must reveal the inner workings of an agency. ("[O]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose." 489 U.S., at 773. ) That is precisely the purpose behind Lissner's request: to open up the Customs Service's action to public scrutiny. The two police officers were charged with -- and pleaded guilty to -- importing anabolic steroids into the United States and not declaring possession of the drugs upon entry, offenses punishable with jail time of up to five years and one year, respectively, and fines of up to $250,000 and $10,000, respectively. 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960(b)(4); 19 U.S.C. § 1459. The officers were assessed fines of $500 each and released. Lissner wants to know why such light punishments were handed down for such serious offenses. Information concerning the amount of contraband seized and the methods in which the police officers were discovered would help explain -- possibly even justify to Lissner's satisfaction -- the Customs Service's handling of the matter. The public has a right to evaluate whether the Customs Service's actions were proper. "It certainly serves FOI Act's purpose to disclose publicly records that document whether the FBI abused its law enforcement mandate." Rosenfeld v. United States Department of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116 S.Ct. 833 (1996). Only the release of the requested documents will answer these questions. Without question, the public has an interest in monitoring the actions and effectiveness of the U.S. Customs Service. Wrongdoing can occur in any government agency, and the people have an interest in overseeing any agency that is doing the public's work. And especially important in a country like ours, where the citizens are the governors and not merely the governed, is the concomitant right to ensure that law-enforcement agencies are themselves abiding by the law. Although Lissner's case involves the public's right to know about the U.S. Customs Service, it must also be recognized that the public has another strong interest in knowing whether -- and to what extent -- local police officers are breaking the law. This court has addressed the importance of public oversight of individual government officials, although the actual state of the law remains unsettled. In Dobronski v. Federal Communications Commission, 17 F.3d 275 (1994), which involved a request for the sick-leave records of a high-level FCC official. Dobronski was alerted to the suspected abuse of the agency's sick-leave policy by a tip. In ruling that the records should be public, this court said:
Dobronski, 17 F.3d at 279. However, the court distinguished Dobronski from Hunt v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 972 F.2d 286 (1992), on the grounds that Dobronski involved Exemption 6, while Hunt involved Exemption 7(c), because the former exemption is less protective of personal privacy than the latter. In Hunt, the court said a prisoner and former FBI informant could not obtain agency records about merely alleged wrongdoing of an FBI agent who handled his case. In this case, the district court said Lissner's claim that the requested Customs Service records may show agency wrongdoing was not sufficient to satisfy the public-interest prong of Exemption 7(c), because Lissner cited no actual proof of agency wrongdoing. Lissner, slip op. at 18. Such a rationale violates the stated intent and the spirit of the FOI Act: a record request may be made for any purpose, public or private. As this court noted in Dobronski, a case that the district court failed even to mention, requiring an FOI Act request to be based on more than allegations of official corruption would frustrate the public interest. "As for the public interest, Dobronski argues correctly that the public has a strong public interest in uncovering corruption in a government agency." Dobronski, 17 F.3d at 278. Continuing to require Exemption 7(c) cases to have corroborating evidence of wrongdoing hinders the public from monitoring public agencies. This rule violates the intent of the FOI Act. CONCLUSION This court should take the opportunity presented by this case to acknowledge that Congress, by passing the 1996 Amendments, intended the FOI Act to be used for any purpose, public or private. Continued adherence to the "central purpose" test articulated in Reporters Committee and its progeny violates the spirit and intent of the FOI Act, as amended in 1996. Requiring FOI Act requesters who suspect official wrongdoing to have corroborating evidence, as the Ninth Circuit does in Exemption 7(c) cases, likewise violates the FOI Act and the 1996 Amendments. Amicus urges this court to reverse the district court's decision.
Dated: Arlington, Virginia
Gregg P. Leslie (counsel of record) Acting Executive Director
Byron R. Brown
The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO CIRCUIT RULE 32(e)(4) Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 32(e)4), I certify that the attached brief uses proportionally spaced Times New Roman typeface of 14 points and contains 6,100 words. Dec. 17, 1999
Gregg P. Leslie (counsel of record) Acting Executive Director The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 1815 N. Fort Myer Drive, Suite 900 Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 807-2100
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