IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JASON LEOPOLD

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01026 (BAH)

PLAINTIFF'S COMBINED STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7(h), Plaintiff Jason Leopold ("Plaintiff") submits this combined statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue and response to the statement of material facts submitted by Defendant Michael G. Sullivan, in his official capacity as Chief, United States Capitol Police, ECF No. 26-2.

Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

Defendant's Statement	**Plaintiff's Response**
1. The U.S. Capitol Police ("USCP") is a law-enforcement agency within the Legislative Branch, headed by the Chief of Police and operating under the direction of the Capitol Police Board. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1961(a), 1969(a).	Undisputed.
2. USCP is charged with safeguarding Congress and its Members, employees, and visitors, and congressional buildings and grounds from crime, disruption, and terrorism.	Undisputed.
3. Plaintiff previously sought access to 101 USCP directives that were in effect on January 6, 2021, and are subject to this litigation. *See Leopold v. Manger*, 630 F. Supp. 3d 71 (D.D.C. 2022) ("*Leopold III*").	Disputed in part. Undisputed that Plaintiff sought access to the 101 USCP Directives that were in effect on January 6, 2021. As used in paragraph 3, "previously" is undefined and vague. On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a request for the 101 USCP Directives that were in effect on January 6, 2021. Leopold Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A.

4. Plaintiff previously obtained Directive 2053.013, Rules of Conduct. Declaration of Aaron Wilensky ("Decl.") ¶¶ 4–5; *Leopold III*, 823 F. Supp. 3d at 79–80 n.9.	Undisputed.
5. The Directive attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit C, titled "Vehicular Pursuits" and dated April 15, 2003, was not in effect on January 6, 2021.	Disputed in part. The assertions in paragraph 5 are not supported by a citation to the record, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) and LCvR 7(h)(1), and are vague, imprecise, and susceptible to multiple interpretations. Undisputed that the version of the Directive attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit C, titled "Vehicular Pursuits" and dated April 15, 2003 was not the same version of the Directive titled "Vehicular Pursuits" that was in effect on January 6, 2021. Disputed to the extent paragraph 5 purports to assert that no Directive titled "Vehicular Pursuits" was in effect on January 6, 2021 because a Directive with that title was in effect on that date. Directives Index (ECF No. 26-4) at 8.
6. The Chief of Police has marked all the Directives at issue in this case as "Law Enforcement Sensitive." Decl. ¶ 8.	Disputed. Current Chief of Police Michael G. Sullivan did not join USCP until June 30, 2025, and so could not have designated the Directives in effect on January 6, 2021 as "Law Enforcement Sensitive" in the time period relevant to this dispute. Veile Decl. ¶ 204 & Ex. 201. To the extent the assertions in paragraph 6 are intended to refer to a previous Chief of Police, the cited portion of the affidavit does not provide admissible evidence to support the factual assertions of paragraph 6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). USCP has not submitted any documentation reflecting the procedure by which it designates information "Law Enforcement Sensitive," the timing of when it purportedly so for the Directives at issue, or the official responsible for doing so.
7. The Law Enforcement Sensitive designation is used widely throughout federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to control and safeguard sensitive information. Decl. ¶ 8.	Disputed. The cited portion of the affidavit does not provide admissible evidence to support the factual assertions of paragraph 7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Further disputed because the term "Law Enforcement Sensitive," is vague, imprecise, and susceptible to multiple interpretations. *See Parhat v. Gates*, 532 F.3d 834, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("'Law Enforcement Sensitive' is an imprecise term; at least seven

	different federal agencies define it differently."). Further disputed because the assertions in paragraph 7 consist of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded.[1]
8. Within the USCP, the Law Enforcement Sensitive designation indicates that such information should only be accessed by those with a need to know and should be reasonably protected from unauthorized disclosure. Decl. ¶ 8.	Disputed. The cited portion of the affidavit does not provide admissible evidence to support the factual assertions of paragraph 8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). USCP has not submitted any documentation reflecting how it determines whether to designate information "Law Enforcement Sensitive," or how it limits access to that information either internally or externally. Further disputed because the terms "should," "those with a need to know," and "reasonably protected from unauthorized disclosure" as used in paragraph 8 are vague, imprecise, and susceptible to multiple interpretations. Further disputed because paragraph 8 consists of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded. *Supra* note 1.
9. All the Directives at issue in this case describe USCP functions that directly contribute to the USCP's law enforcement and security mission. Decl. ¶ 8.	Disputed. The cited portion of the affidavit does not provide admissible evidence to support the factual assertions of paragraph 9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Further disputed because the terms "describe USCP functions," "directly contribute," and "USCP's law enforcement and security mission," as used in paragraph 9 are vague, imprecise, and susceptible to multiple interpretations. Further disputed because paragraph 9 consists of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded. *Supra* note 1.
10. Revelation of the information in the Directives at issue in this case risks compromising USCP's mission because	Disputed. The cited portion of the affidavit does not provide admissible evidence to support the factual assertions of paragraph 9. Fed. R. Civ. P.

[1] See Local Rule 7(h)(1) (stating that a motion for summary judgment "shall be accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue" (emphasis added)); *Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner*, 101 F.3d 145, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting assertion that "relevant facts" section of opposition memorandum satisfied then-applicable Rule 108(h) governing statements of undisputed material facts for, among other things, "repeatedly blending factual assertions with legal argument"); *Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc.*, 239 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting statement of material facts as complying with this Court's local rules because it incorporated a memo that "liberally mixe[d] facts with argument").

many USCP systems are interconnected and interference with one system could impact other mission-critical systems. Decl. ¶ 8.	56(c)(2). Further disputed as contrary to the record, as set forth in Plaintiff's Response Index, this assertion is contrary to the record, as numerous police departments make policies addressing similar topics to USCP's directives either fully public or public in partially redacted form and there is no evidence of harm. *See* Pl.'s Resp. Index at 1–69. Further disputed because the terms "USCP's mission," "USCP systems," "interconnected," and "mission-critical systems" as used in paragraph 9 are vague, imprecise, and susceptible to multiple interpretations. Further disputed because paragraph 10 consists of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded. *Supra* note 1.
11. Documents marked as 2 U.S.C. § 1979 Information on the index are considered "Security Information" and their disclosure is prohibited absent express and specific authorization from the Capitol Police Board. Decl. ¶ 9.	Disputed. The entirety of paragraph 11 consists of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded. *Supra* note 1.
12. The Capitol Police Board is comprised of the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol, with the Chief of Police for the USCP serving as an *ex officio* member without voting rights. Decl. ¶ 9.	Undisputed.
13. The Capitol Police Board has not authorized disclosure of any of the Directives at issue in this case. Decl. ¶ 9.	Disputed in part. A version of Directive 1052.002 ("Vehicular Pursuits") in effect on April 15, 2003 was released in prior litigation. USCP has not submitted any evidence reflecting the procedure by which that Directive was released, what portions of purported "security information" that Directive shares in common with the version of Directive 1053.002 ("Vehicular Pursuits") that was in effect on January 6, 2021, ECF No. 26-4 at 8, or the scope of the prior authorized release.
14. If any of the Directives at issue in this case were publicly disclosed by this Court, it would impair the USCP's ability to execute its mission of protecting the U.S. Capitol and the Congress. Decl. ¶ 14.	Disputed. The entirety of paragraph 14 consists of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded. *Supra* note 1.
15. No reasonably segregable non-security text can be disclosed from any of the Directives at issue in this case without directly or indirectly revealing security	Disputed. As set forth in Plaintiff's Response Index, this assertion is contrary to the record, as numerous police departments make policies addressing similar topics to USCP's directives

information. Decl. ¶ 16.	either fully public or public in partially redacted form. *See* Pl.'s Resp. Index at 23–69. Additionally, the entirety of paragraph 15 consists of legal conclusions and/or arguments that should be disregarded. *Supra* note 1. Additionally disputed on the grounds that "a conclusory assertion that material is exempt and nonsegrable is insufficient to support nondisclosure." *Cf. Campbell v. Dep't of Just.*, 164 F.3d 20, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998), *as amended* (Mar. 3, 1999) (so holding in FOIA case).

Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts

I. United States Capitol Police

1. The United States Capitol Police ("USCP" or the "Capitol Police") is a law enforcement agency whose "mission is to protect the Congress—its Members, employees, visitors and facilities—so it can fulfill its constitutional and legislative responsibilities in a safe, secure and open environment." Veile Decl. Ex. 1.

2. USCP "is responsible for protecting not only the Capitol Complex's buildings, but also Members of Congress, staff, and the millions of individuals who visit the Capitol Complex annually." Veile Decl. Ex. 2 at 14.

3. USCP's statutory duties are outlined in 2 U.S.C. §§ 1901 *et seq.*

4. USCP is required to "police the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds under the direction of the Capitol Police Board[.]" 2 U.S.C. § 1961(a).

5. USCP officers are authorized to "make arrests within the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds for any violations of any law of the United States, of the District of Columbia, or of any State, or any regulation promulgated pursuant thereto." *Id.* § 1961(a).

6. USCP officers are also authorized to make arrests outside Capitol Grounds in specified circumstances, including "with respect to any crime of violence committed in the

presence of the member, if the member is in the performance of official duties . . . when the crime is committed." 2 U.S.C. § 1967(a)(5).

7. Additionally, "[s]ubject to the direction of the Capitol Police Board, the [USCP] is authorized to protect, in any area of the United States, the person of any Member of Congress, officer of the Congress . . . and any member of the immediate family of any such Member or officer, if the Capitol Police Board determines such protection to be necessary." 2 U.S.C. § 1966(a).

8. The Capitol Police Board is empowered to make regulations for the "movement of all vehicular and other traffic, including the parking and impounding of vehicles and limiting the speed thereof, within the United States Capitol Grounds." 2 U.S.C. § 1969(a).

9. USCP is subject to oversight from the Senate's Committee on Rules and Administration and the House of Representatives' Committee on House Administration. 2 U.S.C. § 1901b(a).

10. USCP is subject to oversight by its Office of the Inspector General. Veile Decl. Ex. 3.

11. The USCP "maintains policies and procedures that provide guidance to employees for the performance of their duties." Veile Decl. Ex. 4 at 1.

12. USCP "policies and procedures are categorized as either an SOP or a Directive." *Id.*

13. USCP "SOPs are policies that are specific to a particular bureau or division, whereas Directives are department-wide guidance." *Id.*

14. USCP's "[e]mployees are required to obey all Departmental rules, regulations, Directives, orders, policies and procedures." Veile Decl. Ex. 5 at 7.

II. The Events of January 6, 2021 and scrutiny over the Capitol Police's Response

15. On January 6, 2021, a mob attacked and breached the U.S. Capitol. Veile Decl. Ex. 2 at 24–25.

16. At the time, "Congress was convening in a Joint Session to certify results of the Electoral College vote" of the 2020 presidential election. *Id.* at 23.

17. The riot required congressional leaders to evacuate and the House and Senate chambers to lock down. *Id.* at 25.

18. "January 6, 2021 marked the most significant breach of the Capitol in over 200 years." Veile Decl. Ex. 2 at 21.

19. "Seven hours elapsed between when the security perimeter was first breached and when USCP declared the building secure." *Id.*

20. "On that day, officers faced violent physical and verbal assaults; three officers, and four other individuals, ultimately lost their lives." *Id.*

21. Following the events of January 6, "the Capitol Police has been thoroughly—and understandably—scrutinized." Veile Decl. Ex. 6 at 3.

A. Public Discussion and Scrutiny Over USCP's Preparedness and Response

22. Following the events of January 6, news articles were published that discussed USCP's preparation for and response to the events of that day. *See, e.g.*, Veile Decl. Exs. 7–10.

23. On January 7, 2021, NBC News published an article entitled "What went wrong with security at the Capitol?" on its website (the "NBC Article"). Veile Decl. Ex. 7.

24. The NBC Article stated that "Defense Department officials said Thursday that during planning meetings prior to Jan. 6 led by the Justice Department, city officials and federal

law enforcement agencies requested only modest support from the National Guard and did not anticipate large-scale violence." *Id.*

25. The NBC Article also stated that "online forums popular with far-right activists were filled with threats and expectations of violence in the days leading up to Jan. 6." *Id.*

26. The NBC Article also stated that USCP "failed to deploy enough officers to protect the Capitol from rioters, and put them out in regular uniforms instead of riot gear." *Id.*

27. The NBC Article also stated that "[m]eanwhile, whatever plan the Capitol Police had to request reinforcements didn't work. More than an hour elapsed from the time rioters approached the Capitol building to the time they began smashing their way inside through a window, [Congressman Tim Ryan] said, but no help materialized." *Id.*

28. The NBC Article also stated that "[Congressman] Ryan also wondered whether the Capitol Police were instructed to avoid confrontation." *Id.*

29. The NBC Article also states that "Capitol Police were so overwhelmed they didn't appear to arrest any of the rioters." *Id.*

30. On January 8, 2021, *Time* published an article entitled, "Accusations of Bias, Racism Swirl Around Capitol Police After Mob Attack," on its website (the "*Time* Article"). Veile Decl. Ex. 8.

31. The *Time* Article reported that USCP "has come under intense scrutiny in the last two days for its failure to take seriously explicit threats of violence from extremist groups, despite a record of violent unrest and property damage by groups like the Proud Boys in previous weeks' rioting in D.C." *Id.*

32. The *Time* Article also stated that USCP had "been criticized for some of its members' light touch with the largely white crowd who participated in the attack on the Capitol,

particularly in comparison to violence many non-white protesters faced this summer during the racial justice demonstrations." *Id.*

33. The *Time* Article also stated that "the Capitol Police force has faced multiple lawsuits over the years, and has been plagued with allegations of racism by organizations including the U.S. Capitol Black Police Association[.]" *Id.*

34. The *Time* Article also quoted Vida Johnson, a Georgetown Law associate professor, as observing that "'the Capitol Police is super opaque' . . . 'They don't share any demographic information . . . . So we actually don't know the racial makeup of their force.'" *Id.* (second alteration in original).

35. On January 13, 2021, BuzzFeed News published an article entitled, "Capitol Police Officers Said They Wouldn't Be Surprised if Members of Congress Helped Plan the Attack," on its website (the "BuzzFeed News Article"). Veile Decl. Ex. 9.

36. The BuzzFeed News Article stated that "[t]he three officers, who spoke with BuzzFeed News on condition of anonymity for fear of retribution, lay ultimate blame for what happened on Jan. 6 at the feet of their managers, who they said appeared utterly blindsided by the attack, despite weeks of open planning by the conspirators online." *Id.*

37. The BuzzFeed News Article also stated that "[a]ll three officers say that few provisions were made ahead of last Wednesday's insurrection to prevent officers from being completely overrun. Usually, on a day when police leaders are expecting a big protest or riot, they'd organize a roll call, where they'd inform officers of the perceived threats and give them information about what to expect. The three officers said no such meeting occurred on Wednesday morning." *Id.*

38. The BuzzFeed News Article also stated that "[e]ach of the officers separately pointed out that management didn't even take 'simple measures' ahead of the attack like building a temporary barrier around the Capitol ahead of time." *Id.*

39. The BuzzFeed News Article also stated that "[t]wo of the officers, both of them Black, specifically compared last Wednesday's attack with how management handled the Black Lives Matter protests this summer, and said that the contrast is stark." *Id.*

40. The BuzzFeed News Article quoted one USCP officer as stating: "[Transparency] would improve this department on every level. We're paid by the taxpayers—they should be able to access anything that goes on within this department within reason." *Id.* (alteration in original).

41. On May 17, 2021, Roll Call published an article entitled, "Capitol Police faced equipment shortage during Jan. 6 attack," on its website (the "Roll Call Article") Veile Decl. Ex. 10.

42. The Roll Call Article stated that "[m]ost officers who fought that day did so without helmets, face shields or gas masks that would have better protected them from chemical irritants and blunt force imposed by the rioters. And some of the Capitol Police officers who were properly equipped with helmets and gas masks did not have them on their person when the insurrection took place." *Id*.

43. The Roll Call Article also stated that "[t]he day before the insurrection, officers were directed to pick up helmets from the department's equipment office. The first officer, assigned to a riot control group known as a Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) soft squad for Jan. 6, was hassled by those handling equipment distribution over whether the new helmet was actually needed and had to negotiate to obtain it in preparation for the next day." *Id*.

44. The Roll Call Article also stated that "[t]he four CDU hard squads, equipped with riot gear, had issues of their own. In some instances, hard squad officers who had proper gear didn't wear it during the fighting. Before the mob arrived at the Capitol, at least one CDU hard platoon—around 40 officers—was told by a supervisor to leave all its protective gear on a bus on the West Front and patrol without it." *Id*.

45. The Roll Call Article also stated that "Capitol Police grenadiers, who are trained and equipped to use less lethal munitions, were in short supply that day, a void the Metropolitan Police Department filled." *Id*.

46. The Roll Call Article also stated that "[a]s MPD deployed stun grenades and large tanks of OC spray were used to control violent crowds, many Capitol Police officers — not equipped with gas masks or face shields — were getting hit with the OC spray. Meanwhile, a lot of the insurrectionists had gear to protect them." *Id*.

47. On September 9, 2021, BuzzFeed News published an article written by Plaintiff Jason Leopold entitled "The Capitol Police Granted Permits for Jan. 6 Protests Despite Signs That Organizers Weren't Who They Said They Were." Leopold Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. B.

48. In that article, Plaintiff reported that, based on the documents obtained from USCP, which included six permits for demonstrations to be held on January 6, "along with intelligence assessments about the organizations," that "[t]he chief of the Capitol Police and its top intelligence officer personally approved permits for six demonstrations to be held on Jan. 6, 2021, despite signs that one of the applications was filed for an organization that didn't exist and that five of them were a proxy for a group staging large, violent protests across the country." Leopold Decl. Ex. B.

49. Plaintiff also reported that "Capitol Police documented concerns that organizers had attempted to conceal their affiliation with Ali Alexander, the right-wing activist behind the

group Stop the Steal, in a secret effort to coordinate their protests against the results of the 2020 presidential election. Despite those concerns, and COVID-19 policies that capped demonstrations at 50 people each, the Capitol Police force's intelligence assessment said there were 'no plans for participants to enter the buildings' and noted 'no adverse intelligence related to the upcoming event.' It assessed 'the Level of Probability of acts of civil disobedience/arrests to occur' during the demonstration 'as Highly Improbable.'" *Id.*

50. Other news articles that were published following the events of January 6 discussed allegations of misconduct by USCP officers in connection with that day. *See, e.g.*, Veile Decl. Exs. 12 & 13.

51. On September 11, 2021, USCP posted a press release to its website indicating that its Office of Professional Responsibility had "launched 38 internal investigations" relating to the January 6 attack. Veile Decl Ex. 11.

52. The press release also stated that the "U.S. Attorney's Office did not find sufficient evidence that any of the officers committed a crime." *Id.*

53. On September 14, 2021, NPR published an article entitled "U.S. Capitol Police Recommend Discipline For Six Officers Over Jan. 6 Conduct" (the "NPR Article"), which stated that following January 6, USCP had "launched 38 internal investigations, after reports that some officers assisted or supported pro-Trump rioters." Veile Decl. Ex. 12.

54. The NPR Article further reported that "disciplinary action was recommended" in six cases, but USCP "did not release the names of those being disciplined, did not specify what disciplinary measures would be taken, and did not provide details about their conduct." *Id.*

55. On October 15, 2021, Politico reported that "[a] Capitol Police officer has been charged with helping a Jan. 6 rioter attempt to obstruct justice by encouraging him to delete incriminating social media posts, federal prosecutors announced Friday." Veile Decl. Ex. 13.

56. On Apri 13, 2023, NBC News reported that the same USCP officer had been sentenced in connection with that exchange. Veile Decl. Ex. 14 (relaying that message to rioter had stated officer was "a capitol police officer who agrees with your political stance" and directed rioter to "[t]ake down the part about being in the building they are correctly investigating and everyone who was in the building is going to be charged. Just looking out!").

57. On April 14, 2021, the Department of Justice had announced that it had closed its investigation into the fatal shooting of Ashley Babbitt on January 6, "citing insufficient evidence to support a criminal prosecution of the USCP officer." Veile Decl. Ex. 2 at 25 n.107.

58. On July 6, 2021, Congressman Paul Gosar published a press release entitled, "Who Killed Ashli Babbitt?" Veile Decl. Ex. 15.

59. Congressman Gosar's press release stated: "Six months ago today, Ashli Babbitt, a 110-pound woman with nothing in her hands, not a rock, not a stick or a bat, was shot dead by a still unknown Capitol Hill police officer. Her death has been ruled a homicide. Yet, we have very little information about her death. Our fake news media has asked no questions or sought information about this tragedy. So, I have. And now President Trump has joined me in seeking the truth." *Id.*

60. On August 23, 2021, CNN reported that "USCP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) determined the officer's conduct was lawful and within Department policy, which says an officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes that action

is in the defense of human life, including the officer's own life, or in the defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury." Veile Decl. Ex. 16.

61. On September 9, 2021, Law Fare published an article entitled "Evaluating the Police Shooting of Ashli Babbitt" that stated "[p]ublic discussion, however, is ongoing, and in that sphere the shooting of Ashli Babbitt has become particularly polemical." Veile Decl. Ex. 17.

62. On or about May 19, 2025, ABC News published to its website a video news segment titled "Ashli Babbitt's death caught in competing narratives one year after Jan. 6," during which a reporter stated, *inter alia*, that "to this day, [Babbitt's] death remains a point of contention. Some see her as a patriot . . . But many label her a domestic terrorist." *Ashli Babbitt's death caught in competing narratives one year after Jan. 6*, ABC News (May 19, 2025), https://abcnews.com/video/82123548/, at 2:19–2:37.

63. On June 6, 2025, Politico reported that "[t]he Trump administration will pay a $4.975 million settlement in the lawsuit over the wrongful death of Ashli Babbitt." Veile Decl. Ex. 18.

64. On August 4, 2021, the news outlet Salon published an article entitled, "Why did Lauren Boebert lead a late-night Capitol tour three weeks before Jan. 6?" on its website (the "Salon Article"). Veile Decl. Ex. 19.

65. The Salon Article stated that "[o]n the night of Dec. 12, 2020, the day of the first Stop the Steal rally in Washington and three weeks ahead of the Jan. 6 Capitol insurrection, several guests of then-Rep.-elect Lauren Boebert, R-Colo., received an exclusive after-hours tour of the Capitol building from the far-right firebrand." *Id.*

66. The Salon Article stated that a "Capitol Police officer accompanied Boebert's mother and teenage son to the observation deck at the top of the Capitol Dome for a photo taken by a fourth person, presumably Boebert herself." *Id.*

67. The Salon Article also stated "[t]here are several unanswered questions about this visit, which appears to have violated normal Capitol protocol in various ways. It's not clear who authorized it, since Boebert was not yet a member of Congress and had no official standing in D.C. It's perhaps even stranger that it occurred on a Saturday night, when the Capitol complex is closed." *Id.*

68. The Salon Article further stated that "[t]he guidelines for member-led Capitol tours state they are only available on weekdays from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., and also that all visitors must sign liability waivers and all tours must be led by official Capitol guides, not Capitol Police officers." *Id.*

69. The Salon Article further stated that "Boebert repeatedly denied rumors that she had offered 'reconnaissance tours' to would-be rioters shortly before that event," and that "U.S. Capitol Police didn't immediately return Salon's request for comment on this story." *Id.*

70. On May 19, 2022, The Guardian reported that "House select committee investigating the Capitol attack revealed on Thursday that it had evidence to suggest certain 'reconnaissance tours' took place in the days before 6 January, potentially providing some rioters with a layout of the complex." Veile Decl. Ex. 20.

71. On May 20, 2022, U.S. Representative Barry Loudermilk published a press release entitled, "Ranking Member Davis Demands Release Of 1/5 Capitol Security Tapes" (the "Loudermilk Press Release"). Veile Decl. Ex. 21.

72. The Loudermilk Press Release stated that "[t]oday, Committee on House Administration Ranking Member Rodney Davis (R-Ill.) sent a letter to the US Capitol Police Board demanding release of all January 5th Capitol Security Tapes to the public in a timely manner." *Id.*

73. The Loudermilk Press Release relayed that the letter to the US Capitol Police Board had stated that "[a]ccording to recent press reports, the partisan January 6th Select Committee has falsely accused Rep. Barry Loudermilk (R-GA-11), a respected member of this Committee, of leading so-called reconnaissance tours of the U.S. Capitol on January 5, 2021. This is demonstrably false. As you are aware, Committee Minority staff have reviewed all footage in question and have confirmed no 'reconnaissance tours' occurred." *Id.*

B. Governmental Investigations and Reports Scrutinizing the Capitol Police's Response

74. On January 11, 2022, former USCP Chief of Police J. Thomas Manger provided a statement to the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch. Veile Decl. Ex. 6.

75. The Manger Statement stated that following January 6, USCP was the subject of investigations by "the Office of Inspector General for the Capitol Police, the Government Accountability Office, the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, the committees of jurisdiction within the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate, and other entities." *Id.* at 3.

76. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee conducted a joint oversight investigation into the January 6 attack. Veile Decl. Ex. 22.

77. On June 8, 2021, the Senate Committees published a report (hereinafter, the "Senate Report") on its findings on June 8, 2021. Veile Decl. Ex. 22.

78. The Senate Report, titled "Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack: A Review of the Security, Planning, and Response Failures on January 6" addresses "the security, planning, and response failures of the entities directly responsible for Capitol security—USCP and the Capitol Police Board . . . —along with critical breakdowns involving several federal agencies . . . ." Veile Decl. Ex. 2 at 1.

79. The Senate Report states:

> **USCP's intelligence components failed to convey the full scope of threat information they possessed.** Although USCP mainly relies on the FBI and DHS for intelligence and threat information, USCP has three components responsible for intelligence-related activities. These components, and the materials they produce, are supposed to inform USCP's security and operational planning. This, however, was not the case for January 6.
>
> USCP's lead intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division ("IICD")—was aware of the potential for violence in the days and weeks ahead of January 6. It received information from a variety of sources about threats of violence focused on the Joint Session and the Capitol Complex and the large crowds expected to gather in Washington, D.C. on January 6. Yet, IICD failed to fully incorporate this information into all of its internal assessments about January 6 and the Joint Session. As a result, critical information regarding threats of violence was not shared with USCP's own officers and other law enforcement partners.
>
> USCP's preparations for the Joint Session also suffered because of the decentralized nature of its intelligence components. On January 5, an employee in a separate USCP intelligence-related component received information from the FBI's Norfolk Field Office regarding online discussions of violence directed at Congress, including that protestors were coming to Congress "prepared for war." This report, similar to other information received by IICD, was never distributed to IICD or USCP leadership before January 6.

Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).

80. The Senate Report also states:

> **USCP was not adequately prepared to prevent or respond to the January 6 security threats, which contributed to the breach of the Capitol.** Steven Sund, the USCP Chief on January 6, and Yogananda Pittman, who was designated as Acting Chief after Steven Sund announced his resignation on January 7, both attributed the breach of the Capitol to intelligence failures across the federal government. USCP leadership, however, also failed to prepare a department-wide operational plan for the Joint Session. Similarly, USCP leadership did not develop

> a comprehensive staffing plan for the Joint Session detailing, among other things, where officers would be located. USCP could not provide the Committees any documents showing where officers were located at the start of the attack and how that changed throughout the attack.
>
> USCP leadership also failed to provide front-line officers with effective protective equipment or training. Although USCP activated seven specialty Civil Disturbance Unit ("CDU") platoons in advance of the Joint Session, only four of those platoons were outfitted with special protective equipment, including helmets, hardened plastic armor, and shields. The many other USCP officers who fought to defend the Capitol were left to do so in their daily uniforms. Many of those front-line officers had not received training in basic civil disturbance tactics since their initial Recruit Officer Class training. While some CDU officers were issued special protective equipment, the platoons were not authorized to wear the equipment at the beginning of their shifts. Instead, USCP staged equipment on buses near the Capitol. In at least one instance, when the platoon attempted to retrieve the equipment, the bus was locked, leaving the platoon without access to this critical equipment. USCP also failed to provide equipment training to support the CDU platoons and did not authorize CDU platoons to use all available less-than-lethal munitions, which could have enhanced officers' ability to push back rioters.
>
> These operational failures were exacerbated by leadership's failure to clearly communicate during the attack. USCP leadership gathered in a command center, blocks away from the Capitol building. Two incident commanders identified as responsible for relaying information to front-line officers were forced to engage with rioters during the attack, making it difficult for them to relay information. As a result, communications were chaotic, sporadic, and, according to many front-line officers, non-existent.

Id. at 2–3 (emphasis in original).

81. The Senate Report also stated:

> **USCP's Incident Command System broke down during the attack, leaving frontline officers without key information or instructions as events unfolded.** USCP did not formally designate incident commanders in advance of January 6 through a department-wide operational plan. Senior officers were directly engaged with rioters during the attack, and USCP leadership never took control of the radio system to communicate orders to front-line officers.

Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).

82. The Senate Report also stated that the two USCP divisions that did create division-specific plans—the Uniformed Services Bureau ("USB") and the Civil Disturbance Unit

("CDU")—did not lay "out in detail staffing or officer assignments for the Joint Session." *Id.* at 55.

83. The Senate Report also states that "**[o]paque processes and a lack of emergency authority delayed requests for National Guard assistance**" and that "**[t]he intelligence failures, coupled with the Capitol Police Board's failure to request National Guard assistance prior to January 6, meant DCNG was not activated, staged, and prepared to quickly respond to an attack on the Capitol.**" *Id.* at 3 (emphasis in original).

84. As a result, DCNG did not arrive at the Capitol Complex until 5:20 p.m., "nearly three hours after DOD received USCP's request for assistance and more than four hours after the barriers at the Capitol were first breached." *Id.* at 4.

85. In June 2021, the House of Representatives established a Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (the "House Select Committee"). H. Res. 503 (June 30, 2021).

86. On December 22, 2022, the House Select Committee published a report titled "Final Report: Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (the "House Report"). Veile Decl. Ex. 23 at 3.

87. The House Report described how "[f]ederal and local law enforcement authorities were in possession of multiple streams of intelligence predicting violence directed at the Capitol prior to January 6th. Although some of that intelligence was fragmentary, it should have been sufficient to warrant far more vigorous preparations for the security of the joint session. The failure to sufficiently share and act upon that intelligence jeopardized the lives of the police officers defending the Capitol and everyone in it." *Id.* at 711.

88. The House Report states that "[t]he Capitol Police Board, including Chief Sund, later agreed that a request for the DC National Guard would not be necessary, particularly if the USCP was in an 'all hands on deck' posture." *Id.* at 700.

89. The House Report also states that "Chief Sund did not believe, based on the intelligence he had, that it was then necessary to cancel officers' days off." *Id.* at 700.

90. The House Report also states that "USCP leadership did not create a department-wide plan for the January 6th event." *Id.* at 700.

91. The House Committee on Administration also conducted "a number of public oversight hearings related to the preparations for and responses to the attack on January 6th." Veile Decl. Ex. 24.

92. In a written statement provided to that committee on April 15, 2021, USCP Inspector General Michael A. Bolton discussed two reports prepared regarding January 6—Flash Reports 2021-I-003-A and 2021-I-003-B. *See* Veile Decl. ¶ 26 Ex. 25 (reflecting submission of "USCP IG Summary and Recommendations Report 1"[2] and "USCP IG Summary and Recommendations Report 2"[3]).

93. As described in Bolton's statement, "OIG designed our first flash report to communicate any deficiencies with the Department's operational planning and intelligence for planned demonstrations on January 6, 2021. The deficiencies included the following (a) lack of a comprehensive operational plan or adequate guidance for operational planning, (b) failure to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources, (c) lack of consensus on the

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[2] Available at: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20210415/111443/HHRG-117-HA00-Wstate-BoltonM-20210415-SD003.pdf.

[3] Available at: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA00/20210415/111443/HHRG-117-HA00-Wstate-BoltonM-20210415-SD004.pdf.

interpretation of threat analyses, (d) dissemination of conflicting intelligence, and (e) lack of security clearances." Veile Decl. Ex. 25.

94. Bolton's statement also states that "USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for CDU defining its responsibilities, duties, composition, equipment, and training. CDU was operating at a decreased level of readiness because of a lack of standards for equipment, deficiencies noted from the events of January 6, 2021, a lapse in certain certifications, an inaccurate CDU roster, staffing concerns for the unit, a lack of properly performed quarterly audits, and property inventories not in compliance with guidance." *Id.*

95. In January 2022, then-chief J. Thomas Manger provided a formal statement to the Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch of the House of Representatives, in which he stated that "[i]n less than a year, we developed, and in many instances implemented, significant strategic, tactical, and operational improvements to *every* USCP Bureau." Veile Decl. Ex. 6.

96. The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") issued "several reports examining federal efforts to prepare for January 6 events, gather intelligence, coordinate, and later respond to the attack." Veile Decl. Ex. 26.

97. A GAO report titled "Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Capitol Police Officers for Violent Demonstrations," described the results of GAO's survey of USCP officers who were deployed during the attack (the "GAO Survey Report"). Veile Decl. Ex. 27 at i–ii.

98. The GAO Survey Report described how "Capitol Police officers reported 293 use of force incidents using various types of force against attackers on January 6. After the events, the Capitol Police determined that all use of force incidents were justified. The most prevalent force reported was empty hand control techniques (e.g., pushing) (91 incidents), followed by batons (83)

. . . withdrawing a firearm from its holster (37), chemical spray (34) . . . other physical tactics (22), pointing a firearm at an individual (17), less-lethal munitions (7), a diversionary device (1), and firing a firearm (1)." *Id.* at ii.

99. The GAO Survey Report also describes that "[r]elated to use of force, 207 [USCP officers] felt well or somewhat prepared and 96 felt slightly or not at all prepared. Related to crowd control tactics, 134 felt well or somewhat prepared and 153 felt slightly or not at all prepared." Veile Decl. Ex. 27 at ii.

100. The GAO Survey Report described how "[m]any respondents (80) identified concerns related to use of force, including that they felt discouraged or hesitant to use force because of a fear of disciplinary actions (57); and that leadership needed to clarify the appropriate use of force during situations like the January 6 attack (39)." *Id.* at iii.

101. The GAO Survey Report described how "[o]ver half of respondents (180) expressed that more training was needed, including crowd control (128), very large or violent crowd control (84), and more realistic training (46)." *Id.*

102. The GAO Survey Report also described how "108 respondents commented that more protective equipment is needed, including helmets, riot gear, and shields. Some officers noted that their gear was old or of poor quality and that it was difficult to move around in the hard gear," and that "20 respondents stated that Capitol Police equipment needs to be better positioned, as some of it was not readily accessible to them during the January 6 attack." *Id*. at 53.

III. Plaintiff's Request

103. On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff sent a letter to USCP's Public Information Office (PIO) ("Plaintiff's Request") requesting access to—among other public records—"all United

States Capitol Police written directives that were in force as of January 6, 2021." Leopold Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A.

104. On February 11, 2021, USCP, through counsel, denied Plaintiff's Request, stating "USCP Directives are not public records. This information will not be provided." Ex. 2 to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 1-1 at 7) (filed in *Leopold v. Pittman*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (filed Feb. 23, 2021) ("*Leopold I*")).

105. On February 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Chief of Capitol Police, seeking, in relevant part, an order requiring the production of "USCP written directives in effect on January 6, 2021." *See* Petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 1 at 12) (filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Feb. 23, 2021)).

106. Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his petition for writ of mandamus Directive 2053.013 (Rules of Conduct), effective date Nov. 19, 2012. Ex. 4 to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 11 (ECF No. 1-1 at 11–18) (filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Feb. 23, 2021)).

107. Directive 2053.013 had been filed in the public docket in *Breiterman v. U.S. Capitol Police*, Case No. 1:16-cv-893-TJK (D.D.C. June 28, 2017) (ECF No. 27-5); *see also* Petition for Writ of Mandamus (ECF No. 1 at 11) (filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Feb. 23, 2021)).

108. In *Leopold I*, USCP submitted the Declaration of James W. Joyce, Senior Counsel of the Office of the General Counsel, General Law Division, for the U.S. Capitol Police. Joyce Decl. (ECF No. 19-5) (filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Sept. 30, 2021)).[4]

[4] The Joyce Declaration is attached as Exhibit 28 to the Veile Declaration.

109. As relayed by the Joyce Declaration, in *Leopold I*, USCP identified a total of 178 directives responsive to Plaintiff's Request. *Id*. ¶ 7.

110. The Joyce Declaration represented that August 17, 2021, USCP released Directive 1000.002 (Retrieval of Archived Video) to Plaintiff, which it represented it had "filed on the public docket in connection with litigation." *Id.* ¶ 7.

111. The Joyce Declaration represented that "a USCP Document Review Team" had determined that a total of 111 of its directives did not contain "security information" as set forth in 2 U.S.C. § 1979. *Id*. ¶ 8.

112. As relayed by the Joyce Declaration, in September 2021, Plaintiff communicated to Defendant that Plaintiff was willing to narrow his request to a total of 36 of the directives USCP conceded did not contain "security information" in September 2021. *Id.*

113. The Joyce Declaration represented that a "USCP Document Review Team" had determined that another 65 directives were "security information under 2 U.S.C. § 1979." Joyce Decl. ¶ 9.

114. USCP filed a list of 101 directives in *Leopold I*, listing the numbers and titles of the directives it conceded did not contain "security information" and those it contended did contain such information. *See* Compl. Ex. A (ECF No. 1-2) (as refiled in this case); *see also* ECF No. 19-7 (as filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Sept. 30, 2021)).

115. USCP's list of directives filed in *Leopold I* indicated that Directive 1000.002 was designated in its entirety as "security information" by USCP. Compl. Ex. A (ECF No. 1-2) (as refiled in this case); *see also* ECF No. 19-7 (as filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Sept. 30, 2021)).

116. However, USCP released Directive 1000.002 (Retrieval of Archived Video) in its entirety to Plaintiff, with no redactions. *See* Compl. Ex. A (ECF No. 1-2) (as refiled in this case); *see also* ECF No. 19-7 (as filed in *Leopold I*, No. 1:21-cv-00465 (Sept. 30, 2021)).

117. A version of Directive 1053.002 (Vehicular Pursuits) with an effective date of April 15, 2003 was filed publicly without redaction in *Anyaso v. Capitol Police*, No. 1:12-cv-01327-ESH (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (ECF 17-5).

118. Directive 1053.002, as filed in *Anyaso*, was filed in this litigation at ECF No. 1-4.

IV. Publicly Available Information About USCP and its Inspector General

119. On or about January 7, 2021, USCP published a press release to its website titled "U.S. Capitol Police Arrests – January 6, 2021," which listed, *inter alia*, fourteen individuals arrested by USCP that day. Veile Decl. ¶ 187 & Ex. 184.

120. On or about January 7, 2021, USCP also published a press release to its website titled "Statement of Steven Sund, Chief of Police, Regarding the Events of January 6, 2021" (the "Sund Statement"). Veile Decl. ¶ 189 & Ex. 186.

121. The Sund Statement relayed that, as the riot was unfolding, "USCP officers were simultaneously responding to a report of a pipe bomb in the 300 block of First Street, SE, and a second pipe bomb in the 400 block of Canal Street, SE." Id.

122. The Sund Statement stated that "[a] suspicious vehicle was also identified in the 300 block of First Street, SE, at this time." *Id.*

123. The Sund Statement stated that "[t]he suspicious vehicle was thoroughly investigated by the USCP, FBI, and ATF. It has been cleared of any hazards. The USCP arrested the vehicle's owner along with 13 additional suspects for unlawful entry of the U.S. Capitol." *Id.*

124. The Senate Report included the following organizational chart regarding USCP:



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Veile Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 2 at 16.

125. The Senate Report also stated that "[t]he majority of USCP's uniformed officers fall under the Office of the Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed Operations. These are the 'primary officers' seen around the Capitol Complex and other officers assigned to entities commonly found in traditional police departments, including hazardous devices response teams, SWAT teams, and K9 teams. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Police for Protective and Intelligence operations is responsible for USCP's intelligence analysis and physical security infrastructure." *Id*. (internal citations omitted).

126. The Senate Report also stated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") Office of Intelligence and Analysis "participate in information sharing and partnerships with federal and local law enforcement, including USCP and MPD. Intelligence is usually conveyed via written analytical products, including (1) threat assessments, (2) bulletins, and (3) information reports." *Id.* at 20 (internal citation omitted).

127. USCP maintains on its website a "Prohibited Items" page for Capitol visitors. Veile Decl. ¶ 30 & Ex. 29.

128. USCP also maintains a web page titled "Contact," which includes a phone number and email address for the "Public Information Office (press inquiries)." Veile Decl. ¶ 31 & Ex. 30.

129. USCP also maintains a web page titled "Capitol Police Board Regulations," which includes nine documents. Veile Decl. ¶ 32 & Ex. 31.

130. The Capitol Police Board U.S. Capitol Grounds Traffic Regulations, required to be made public by 2 U.S.C. § 1969(c), are available on its website at https://www.uscp.gov/sites/evo-subsites/uscp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/CTR-Amended-February-2025-with-Appendices.pdf.

131. The Capitol Police Board Regulations for the Truck Interdiction Program Providing for the Extended Capitol Police Zone are also available on its website. Veile Decl. ¶ 33 & Ex. 32.

132. In or about mid-2023, USCP Inspector General began publicly releasing certain of its reports on its website. *See* Veile Decl. ¶ 34 & Ex. 33 (printout of list of published reports available at https://www.uscpoig.gov/oig-reports, along with publication date, as of Nov. 9, 2026).

133. For example, a redacted version of OIG Rep. 2017-11 (Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Purchase Card Program (released 12/04/25)) is available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 35 & Ex. 34.

134. A redacted version of OIG Rep. 2019-15 (Audit of United States Capitol Police Interactions with Individuals with Disabilities (released 05/20/25) is also available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 36 & Ex. 35.

135. A redacted version of OIG Rep. 2021-I-0003-A (A Review of Events Surrounding January 6, 2021, Flash Report: Operational Planning & Intelligence (released 6/24/24)) is also available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 37 & Ex. 36.

136. A redacted version of OIG Rep. 2021-I-0003-C (A review of Events Surrounding January 6, 2021, Flash Report: Counter-Surveillance and Threat Assessment (released 6/4/26)) is also available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 38 & Ex. 37.

137. A redacted version of OIG Rep. 2021-I-0003-D (Review of Events Surrounding January 6, 2021, Flash Report: Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Team (released 9/3/26)) is also available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 39 & Ex. 38.

138. A redacted version of OIG Rep. 2021-I-0003-E (Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol Flash Report: Command and Coordination Bureau (released 10/28/26)) is also available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 40 & Ex. 39.

139. A redacted version of OIG Rep. 2025-11 (Management Advisory Report: Security Services Bureau Noncompliance with Key Control Procedures and Outdated Policies and Procedures (released on 3/18/26)) is also available on USCP's website. Veile Decl. ¶ 41 & Ex. 40.

140. On or about September 18, 2021, the following photo appeared on USA Today's website depicting USCP officers in riot gear at the U.S. Capitol during a "Justice for Jan. 6" rally on September 18, 2021 in Washington, D.C.:



Police in riot gear monitor the area as Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol during the "Justice for Jan. 6" rally on Sept. 18, 2021 in Washington DC.

Jessica Koscielniak, USA TODAY

Veile Decl. ¶ 43.

141. On or about September 17, 2025, the U.S. Capitol Police posted a video on YouTube titled "U.S. Capitol Police Lead Joint Civil Disturbance Training." *See* U.S. Capitol Police, *U.S. Capitol Police Lead Joint Civil Disturbance Training*, YouTube (Sept. 17, 2025), https://youtu.be/cZ6_Hp-A1-k?si=ulLuHMU9jPSoBSqb.

142. The video contained, *inter alia*, footage of a training exercise that USCP led in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies, including the below still taken from the video:



Veile Decl. ¶ 42.

V. Disclosures by Other Governmental Agencies of Comparable Policy Documents

143. The U.S. Park Police ("USPP") maintains a webpage titled "U.S. Park Police General Orders" located at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/uspp/u-s-park-police-general-orders.htm.

144. U.S. Park Police Gen. Order 2003 (U.S. Capitol Grounds and U.S. Supreme Court Building and Grounds) is available at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/uspp/upload/G-O-2003-U-S-Capitol-Grounds-and-U-S-Supreme-Court-Buildings-10-31-02-Supreme-Court-Buildings-10-31-02.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 44 & Ex. 41.

145. U.S. Park Police Gen. Order 2301 (Demonstrations and Special Events) is available at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/uspp/upload/General-Order-2301-Demonstrations-and-Special-Events.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 45 & Ex. 42.

146. U.S. Park Police Gen. Order 2205 (Vehicular Pursuits) is available at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/uspp/upload/G-O-2205-Vehicular-Pursuits-rev-2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 46 & Ex. 43.

147. U.S. Park Police Gen. Order 3600 (Response to Resistance and Use of Force Standards) is available at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/uspp/upload/G-O-3600-Response-to-Resistance-and-Use-of-Force-Standards-4-17-26.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 47 & Ex. 44.

148. The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") maintains a webpage titled "Department of Homeland Security Management Directives" located at https://www.dhs.gov/department-homeland-security-management-directives.

149. DHS Dir. 010-02 (Emergency Preparedness Program) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/disaster-management/mgmt-dir_010-02-emergency-preparedness-program_revision-01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 48 & Ex. 45.

150. DHS Dir. 103-02 (Enterprise Architecture Management) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/Directive%20103-02.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 49 & Ex. 46.

151. DHS Dir. 138-01 (Enterprise Technology Configuration Management) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/05.%20Directive%20138-01%2C%20Enterprise%20Information%20Technology%20Configuration%20Management%20%285-6-14%29.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 50 & Ex. 47.

152. DHS Dir. 140-01 (Information Technology Security Program) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/information-and-technology-management/mgmt-dir_140-01-info-tech-security-program_revision-02.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 51 & Ex. 48.

153. DHS Dir. 252-01 (Organization of the Department of Homeland Security) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/human-resources/mgmt-dir_252-01-organization-of-the-dhs_rev-00.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 52 & Ex. 49.

154. DHS Dir. 256-01 (DHS Anti-Harassment Policy) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/human-resources/mgmt-dir_256-01-anti-harassment-program_rev-02.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 53 & Ex. 50.

155. DHS Dir. 262-04 (DHS Web - Internet and Extranet Information) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/information-and-technology-management/mgmt-dir_262-04-dhs-web-internet-extranet-information_revision-00.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 205 & Ex. 202.

156. DHS Dir. 262-05 (Information Sharing and Safeguarding) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/information-and-technology-management/mgmt-dir_262-05-information-sharing-and-safeguarding.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 54 & Ex. 51.

157. DHS Dir. 0480.1 (Ethics/Standards of Conduct) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/administrative-management/mgmt-dir_0480-1-ethics-standards-of-conduct.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 55 & Ex. 52.

158. DHS Dir. 0810.1 (Office of the Inspector General) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 56 & Ex. 53.

159. DHS Dir. 11042.1 (Safeguarding Sensitive but Unclassified Information) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Management%20Directive%2011042.1%20

Safeguarding%20Sensitive%20But%20Unclassified%20%28For%20Official%20Use%20Only%29%20Information_0.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 57 & Ex. 54.

160. DHS Policy Statement 044-5 (Use of Force) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-02/23_0206_s1_use-of-force-policy-update.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 58 & Ex. 55.

161. DHS 4300A (Information Technology System Security Program, Sensitive Systems) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/4300A%20ITSSP%20SS%20Attachment%20F%20Incident%20Response.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 59 & Ex. 56.

162. The Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") maintains a webpage titled "FOIA Electronic Reading Room" at https://www.tsa.gov/foia/readingroom, which can be sorted by the category "Management Directives."

163. TSA Management Dir. 100.4 (Transportation Security Searches) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-readingroom/transportation_security_searches_100.4.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 60 & Ex. 57.

164. TSA Management Dir. 1100.61-1 (Dismissals and Closures) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-readingroom/tsa-md-1100.61-1-dismissals-and-closures-pg-3.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 202 & Ex. 199.

165. TSA Management Dir. 1100.61-6 (Emergency Evacuation Administrative Procedures) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-readingroom/1100.61-6_emergency_evacuation_administrative_procedures.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 61 & Ex. 58.

166. TSA Management Dir. 2800.16 (Identification Media and Access Control Program) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-

readingroom/identification_media_and_access_control_program_2800.16.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 62 & Ex. 59.

167. TSA Management Dir. 3300.2 (Emergency Preparedness) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-readingroom/emergency_preparedness_3300.2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 63 & Ex. 60.

168. TSA Management Dir. 3500.2 (Use of Force and Firearms) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-readingroom/use_of_force_and_firearms_3500.2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 64 & Ex. 61.

169. TSA Management Dir. 3700.4 (Handling Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information) is available at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/foia-readingroom/handling_sensitive_personally_identifiable_information_3700.4.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 65 & Ex. 62.

170. TSA Information Assurance Handbook (Attach. 1 to TSA Dir. 1400.3 IT Security) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0727_tsa_information-assurance-handbook.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 201 & Ex. 198.

171. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") maintains a webpage titled "FOIA ICE Library" at https://www.ice.gov/foia/library, which can be sorted by the category "Policies, Procedures, and Manuals."

172. ICE Dir. 7-6.1 (Border Searches of Electronic Devices) is available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 66 & Ex. 63.

173. ICE Dir. 19009.3 (Firearms and Use of Force) is available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/policy/19009.3.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 67 & Ex. 64.

174. HSI Handbook 12-04 (Search and Seizure) is available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/policy/hsi12-04_SearchSeizure_09.14.2012.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 68 & Ex. 65.

175. HSI Handbook 15-03 (Arrest Procedure) is available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/policy/handbookHSI_15-03_ArrestProcedures_Jul21_2015.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 69 & Ex. 66.

176. U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") also maintains a webpage titled "FOIA Reading Room" at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/accountability-and-transparency/foia-reading-room, which can be sorted by the category "Administrative Handbooks, Directives & Policy Guidance/Memos."

177. CBP Dir. No. 4510-026B (Emergency Driving and Vehicular Pursuits) is available at https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2025-12/intc-44545_-_cbp_directive_no._4510-026b_usbp_redacted.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 70 & Ex. 67.

178. The FBI has made redacted versions of its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) available to the public on its website located at https://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29.

179. The FBI's 2016 DIOG, available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FBI.DIOG_.pdf, addresses the standards for opening preliminary investigations. Veile Decl. ¶ 71 & Ex. 68.

180. The U.S. Air Force maintains a webpage titled "Publications and Forms," available at https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/product-index/.

181. Joint Base Andrews Instruction 10-101 is available at https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/jbandrews-naf_washington_dc/publication/jbandrewsi10-101/jbandrewsi10-101.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 72 & Ex. 69.

182. The U.S. Marines Corps maintains a webpage titled "MARADMINS" located at https://www.marines.mil/news/Messages/MARADMINS/.

183. MARADMIN 547/24 (Employment of Crash-Rated Active Vehicle Barriers) is available at https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/3965409/employment-of-crash-rated-active-vehicle-barriers/. Veile Decl. ¶ 73 & Ex. 70.

184. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") has, "[i]n order to help promote transparency . . . posted policy statements issued by the Chief of Police (e.g., general orders, executive orders, and other directives) that are currently in effect for the department" at https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/written-directives-general-orders.

185. MPD Gen. Order 101.10 (Organization of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_101_10.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 74 & Ex. 71.

186. MPD Gen. Order 110.11 (Uniform, Equipment, and Appearance Standards) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_110_11.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 75 & Ex. 72.

187. MPD Gen. Order 120.25 (Office of Police Complaints Investigations) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_120_25.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 76 & Ex. 73.

188. MPD Gen. Order 201.03 (Grievance Procedures) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_201_03.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 77 & Ex. 74.

189. MPD Gen. Order 201.09 (Equal Employment Opportunity) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_201_09.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 78 & Ex. 75.

190. MPD Gen. Order 201.26 (Code of Conduct - Unbiased Policing) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_201_26.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 79 & Ex. 76.

191. MPD Gen. Order 201.29 (Police Officer Initial Training) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/go/3820000.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 80 & Ex. 77.

192. MPD Gen. Order 204.01 (Media) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/3196000.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 81 & Ex. 78.

193. MPD Gen. Order 204.04 (Ride-Along Program) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_204_04.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 82 & Ex. 79.

194. MPD Gen. Order 301.03 (Vehicle Pursuits) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_301_03.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 83 & Ex. 80.

195. MPD Gen. Order 302.01 (Calls for Service) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_302_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 84 & Ex. 81.

196. MPD Gen. Order 302.03 (Social Media) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_302_03.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 85 & Ex. 82.

197. MPD Gen. Order 302.05 (Radio Communications and Computer Aided Dispatch) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_302_05.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 86 & Ex. 83.

198. MPD Gen. Order 302.10 (Mobile Device Security) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_302_10.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 87 & Ex. 84.

199. MPD Gen. Order 302.12 (Criminal Justice Information Services Security) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_302_12.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 88 & Ex. 85.

200. MPD Gen. Order 303.01 (Traffic Enforcement) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_303_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 89 & Ex. 86.

201. MPD Gen. Order 304.04 (Interception of Wire or Oral Communications) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_04.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 90 & Ex. 87.

202. MPD Gen. Order 304.08 (Crime Scene Response and Evidence Collection) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_08.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 91 & Ex. 88.

203. MPD Gen. Order 304.10 (Field Contacts, Stops, and Pat Downs) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_10.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 92 & Ex. 89.

204. MPD Gen. Order 304.14 (Assisting Individuals with Physical and Mental Disabilities) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_14.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 93 & Ex. 90.

205. MPD Gen. Order 304.20 (Civil Protection Orders and Criminal Restraining Orders) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_304_20.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 94 & Ex. 91.

206. MPD Gen. Order 308.12 (Diplomats and Foreign Nationals) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_308_12.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 95 & Ex. 92.

207. MPD Gen. Order 310.01 (U.S. Capitol Police) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_310_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 96 & Ex. 93.

208. MPD Gen. Order 310.06 (Metro Transit Police) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_310_06.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 97 & Ex. 94.

209. MPD Gen. Order 401.01 (RMS Reports) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_401_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 98 & Ex. 95.

210. MPD Gen. Order 501.02 (Handling Interactions with Transgender Individuals) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_501_02.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 99 & Ex. 96.

211. MPD Gen. Order 501.04 (Conducting Police Business in Federal Government Buildings) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_501_04.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 100 & Ex. 97.

212. MPD Gen. Order 502.01 (Transporting Custodial Arrestees) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_502_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 101 & Ex. 98.

213. MPD Gen. Order 502.06 (Citation Release Program) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/3790000.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 102 & Ex. 99.

214. MPD Gen. Order 702.02 (Warrantless Searches) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_702_02.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 103 & Ex. 100.

215. MPD Gen. Order 702.03 (Search Warrants) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_702_03.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 104 & Ex. 101.

216. MPD Gen. Order 800.01 (Critical Incidents and Unusual Events) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_800_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 105 & Ex. 102.

217. MPD Gen. Order 801.01 (Crowd Management and Civil Unrest) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_801_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 106 & Ex. 103.

218. MPD Gen. Order 803.01 (Infectious Disease Prevention) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_803_01.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 107 & Ex. 104.

219. MPD Gen. Order 803.06 (Real Time Crime Center Operations) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_803_06.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 108 & Ex. 105.

220. MPD Gen. Order 901.04 (Less Lethal Weapons) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_901_04.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 109 & Ex. 106.

221. MPD Gen. Order 901.07 (Use of Force) is available at https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_901_07.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 110 & Ex. 107.

222. The Chicago Police Department maintains a website titled "Department Directives System," and located at https://directives.chicagopolice.org/, which it states is "the official repository for current [Chicago Police Department] directives." Veile Decl. Ex. 109.

223. The Chicago Police Department Directives System webpage states that "As part of the CPD's ongoing mission to grow trust within the communities we serve, CPD seeks to provide the community meaningful opportunity to comment on Department policies. As part of these efforts, CPD periodically posts policies for public review and comment." *Id.*

224. Chicago Police Dep't S.O. S02-07-03X (Interactions with Persons who are Deaf, Deafblind, or Hard of Hearing) is available at https://www.chicagopolice.org/policy-review/interactions-with-persons-with-disabilities-policy-suite/. Veile Decl. ¶ 114 & Ex. 111.

225. Chicago Police Dep't S.O. S04-03-06 (Eavesdropping Devices) is available at https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6727?f=interception. Veile Decl. ¶ 115 & Ex. 112.

226. Chicago Police Dep't S.O. S11-09 (Law Enforcement National Data Exchange) is available at https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6107?f=information%20exchange. Veile Decl. ¶ 116 & Ex. 113.

227. Chicago Police Dep't Gen. Order 05-03 (Critical Incident Response Program) is available at https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6230. Veile Decl. ¶ 117 & Ex. 114.

228. Chicago Police Dep't Gen. Order 05-04 (Hazardous Material (Haz-Mat) Incidents) is available at https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6239. Veile Decl. ¶ 118 & Ex. 115.

229. Chicago Police Dep't U03-05 (Access Security Policy - Chicago Public Safety Headquarters) is available at https://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6349. Veile Decl. ¶ 203 & Ex. 200.

230. Baltimore Police Dep't Policy 1017 (Mobile Device Searches) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/55050. Veile Decl. ¶ 119 & Ex. 116.

231. Baltimore Police Dep't Policy 1905 (Flying While Armed) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/681924. Veile Decl. ¶ 120 & Ex. 117.

232. Baltimore Police Dep't Gen. Order O-8 (Respiratory Protection Program) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/BALTIMOREMD/documents/319856. Veile Decl. ¶ 121 & Ex. 118.

233. The Atlanta Police Department ("APD") makes its Standard Operating Procedures available through its website located at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/list (accessed via https://www.atlantapd.org/about-apd and selecting "Standard Operating Procedures").

234. APD SOP 1070 (Coordination with Outside Agencies) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/list/documents/487933. Veile Decl. ¶ 122 & Ex. 119.

235. APD SOP 2086 (Firearms Training and Range Rules) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/1917999. Veile Decl. ¶ 123 & Ex. 120.

236. APD SOP 2300 (Atlanta Citizen Review Board Investigations) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/488590. Veile Decl. ¶ 124 & Ex. 121.

237. APD SOP 3020 (Search and Seizure) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/488592. Veile Decl. ¶ 125 & Ex. 122.

238. APD SOP 3080, § 4.4 (Bias Based Profiling) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/488610. Veile Decl. ¶ 126 & Ex. 123.

239. APD SOP 3081 (Crime Scene Investigation) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/488611. Veile Decl. ¶ 127 & Ex. 124.

240. APD SOP 3082 (Responding to Persons Experiencing a Mental Health Crisis) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/488612. Veile Decl. ¶ 128 & Ex. 125.

241. APD SOP 3181 (Emergency Operations Plan) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/list/documents/488633. Veile Decl. ¶ 129 & Ex. 126.

242. APD SOP 3182 (Bomb Squad and Explosive Detection Units) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/list/documents/488634. Veile Decl. ¶ 130 & Ex. 127.

243. APD SOP 3190 (Juvenile Procedures) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/488638. Veile Decl. ¶ 131 & Ex. 128.

244. APD SOP 3300 (Social Media and Online Conduct) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/4014029. Veile Decl. ¶ 132 & Ex. 129.

245. APD SOP 4010 (Traffic) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/489138. Veile Decl. ¶ 133 & Ex. 130.

246. APD SOP 4044 (Tactical Field Operator) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/list/documents/781334. Veile Decl. ¶ 134 & Ex. 131.

247. APD SOP 6050 (Information Technology (IT) and Data Sharing) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/APD13/documents/489508. Veile Decl. ¶ 135 & Ex. 132.

248. The New York City Police Department ("NYPD") makes its Patrol and Administrative Guides available to the public through its website located at https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/manual.page.

249. NYPD Procedure 207-28 (Processing Civilian Complaints) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide1.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 136 & Ex. 133.

250. NYPD Procedure 208-03 (Arrests – General Processing) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide1.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 137 & Ex. 134.

251. NYPD Procedure 208-05 (Arrest – General Search Guidelines) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide1.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 138 & Ex. 135.

252. NYPD Procedure 208-12 (Alternate Procedure for Fingerprint and Palmprint Processing Due to Computer System Failure) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 139 & Ex. 136.

253. NYPD Procedure 212-16 (Evacuations of New York City Transit Trains) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 140 & Ex. 137.

254. NYPD Procedure 212-56 (Diplomatic Incidents) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 141 & Ex. 138.

255. NYPD Procedure 213-19 (Interoperability Channels) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 142 & Ex. 139.

256. NYPD Procedure 213-20 (Response to First Amendment Activities) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 143 & Ex. 140.

257. NYPD Procedure 215-10 (Arrest of Juvenile Offender or Adolescent Offender) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide3.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 144 & Ex. 141.

258. NYPD Procedure 219-14 (Department Computer Systems) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide4.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 145 & Ex. 142.

259. NYPD Procedure 221-13 (Mentally Ill or Emotionally Disturbed Persons) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-pguide4.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 146 & Ex. 143.

260. NYPD Procedure 304-18 (Department Email Policy) is available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/public-adminguide1.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 147 & Ex. 144.

261. The Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") makes its manual available to the public at https://www.lapdonline.org/lapd-manual-2/.

262. LAPD's Manual, Vol. I § 345, addresses LAPD's Policy Prohibiting Bias Based Profiling, and is available at

https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/VOLUME_1_Q1_2026_Updates_from_1_1_26_to_3_31_26_.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 148 & Ex. 145.

263. LAPD's Manual, Vol. III § 895, addresses its Office of the Inspector General, and is available at https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/VOLUME_3_Q1_2026_Updates_from_1_1_26_to_3_31_26_.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 149 & Ex. 146.

264. LAPD's Code of Ethics is also available at https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/LAW_ENFORCEMENT_CODE_OF_ETHICS.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 150 & Ex. 147.

265. LAPD also makes its FTSU tactical directives available to the public via the webpage https://www.lapdonline.org/ftsu-tactical-directives/.

266. LAPD Use of Force Dir. 1 (Use of Force) is available at https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/UOF_Directive_No_1_September_2023.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 151 & Ex. 148.

267. LAPD Use of Force Dir. 8.1 (Electronic Control Device) is available at https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/Use-of-Force-Directive-Electronic-Control-Device-Taser-7-8.1-December-2025.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 152 & Ex. 149.

268. LAPD Use of Force Dir. 10 (Handcuffing) is available at https://lapdonlinestrgeacc.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/lapdonlinemedia/UOF_Directive_No_10_Handcuffing_December_2023.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 153 & Ex. 150.

269. The Maryland Capitol Police ("MD Capitol Police"), makes its Directives available to the public through its website located at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree

(accessed via https://mcp.maryland.gov/Pages/Documents_Forms.aspx and selecting "Directives Manuals").

270. Md. Capitol Police Dir. 03.02 (Employee Identification Cards) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree/documents/1503899. Veile Decl. ¶ 154 & Ex. 151.

271. Md. Capitol Police Dir. 03.10 (Training) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree/documents/2223420. Veile Decl. ¶ 155 & Ex. 152.

272. Md. Capitol Police Dir. 07.02 (Emergency Vehicle Operations) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree/documents/1485347. Veile Decl. ¶ 156 & Ex. 153.

273. Md. Capitol Police Dir. 11.02 (Releasing Police Reports) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree/documents/2437719. Veile Decl. ¶ 157 & Ex. 154.

274. Md. Capitol Police Dir. 13.03 (Responses to Fires and Fire Alarms) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree/documents/1555955. Veile Decl. ¶ 158 & Ex. 155.

275. Md. Capitol Police Dir. 14.09 (Events on Capitol Grounds) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/MarylandCP/tree/documents/1273904. Veile Decl. ¶ 159 & Ex. 156.

276. The California Highway Patrol also makes its Highway Patrol Manual available to the public through its website located at https://www.chp.ca.gov/policy/highway-patrol-manual-hpm/.

277. The California Highway Patrol houses a Protective Services Division which provides "law enforcement services for the State Capitol, state employees, state facilities, and state agencies located throughout the state." Veile Decl. ¶ 160 & Ex. 157.

278. Cal. Highway Patrol Manual 90.1 Ch. 2 (Office of Community Outreach and Media Relations) is available at https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/policy/hpm/hpm-90.1/hpm-90.1-ch-2.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 161 & Ex. 158.

279. Cal. Highway Patrol Manual 100.7 Ch. 10 (State Property Event Permits) is available at https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/policy/hpm/hpm-100.70/hpm-100.70-ch-10.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 162 & Ex. 159.

280. Cal. Highway Patrol Manual 11.2 Ch. 8 (Equipment) is available at https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/policy/hpm/hpm-11.2/hpm-11.2-ch-8.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 163 & Ex. 160.

281. Cal. Highway Patrol Gen. Order 100.82 (Field Interviews) is available at https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/policy/go/go-100.82-chp-302a-field-interview.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 164 & Ex. 161.

282. Cal. Highway Patrol Gen. Order 100.84 (Service of Search and Arrest Warrants Involving Entry into Residences, Businesses, and other Structures) is available at https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/policy/go/go-100.84-service-of-search-and-arrest-warrants-warrant-service-program.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 165 & Ex. 162.

283. Cal. Highway Patrol Gen. Order 100.101 (Active Shooter Response) is available at https://www.chp.ca.gov/siteassets/policy/go/go-100.101-active-shooter-response_sanitized.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 166 & Ex. 163.

284. The Georgia Department of Public Safety also makes its Policy Manual available to the public through its website located at https://dps.georgia.gov/documents/publications-and-reports/dps-policy-manual.

285. The Georgia Department of Public Safety houses a Capitol Police Division which "provides security for elected officials, state employees, and guests at the State Capitol and buildings on Capitol Hill." Veile Decl. ¶ 167 & Ex. 164.

286. Ga. Dep't Pub. Safety Policy No. 11.02.3 (Bias Based Profiling) is available at https://dps.georgia.gov/document/document/1102-bias-based-profiling/download. Veile Decl. ¶ 168 & Ex. 165.

287. Ga. Dep't Pub. Safety Policy No. 25.09 (Capitol Police Division) is available at https://dps.georgia.gov/chapter-25-special-units-support-ser. Veile Decl. ¶ 169 & Ex. 166.

288. Ga. Dep't Pub. Safety Policy No. 13.02 (Records, Forms, and Reports) is available at https://dps.georgia.gov/chapter-13-reports-records. Veile Decl. ¶ 170 & Ex. 167.

289. Pa. Off. Gov. Management Dir. 625.10 (Card Reader and Emergency Response Access to Certain Capitol Complex Buildings and Other State Office Buildings) is available at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/oa/documents/policies/md/600/625_10.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 171 & Ex. 168.

290. Pa. Off. Gov. Management Dir. 205.37 Amended (Role Assignment, Security, and Internal Control Maintenance) is available at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/oa/documents/policies/md/200/205_37.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 172 & Ex. 169.

291. Phila. Police Dep't Directive 4.1 (Responsibilities at Crime Scenes) is available at https://www.phillypolice.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/D4.1-REV-6-17-22-REDACTED.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 173 & Ex. 170.

292. Durham Police Dep't Gen. Order 4049 R-5 (Communicable Diseases and Bloodborne Pathogens) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/DPDNC/documents/577322. Veile Decl. ¶ 174 & Ex. 171.

293. San Diego Police Dep't Proc. 1.46 (Use of the Long-Range Acoustical Device (LRAD)) is available at https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/146.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 175 & Ex. 172.

294. San Antonio Police Dep't Manual Proc. 317 (Public Safety Headquarters Building Security) is available at https://www.sa.gov/files/assets/main/v/1/sapd/policy-and-procedures/317-public-safety-headquarters-building-security-07102013.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 176 & Ex. 173.

295. OSHA Standard No. 1910.1030 is available at https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.1030. Veile Decl. ¶ 177 & Ex. 174.

296. San Francisco Police Dep't Gen. Order 5.06 (Citation Release) is available at https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/your-sfpd/policies/general-orders/5-06. Veile Decl. ¶ 178 & Ex. 175.

297. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep't SO 1-08 (Interactions with Transgender Individuals) is available at https://slmpd.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Interactions-with-Transgender-Individuals.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 179 & Ex. 176.

298. Seattle Police Dep't Manual 5.002 (Responsibilities of Employees Concerning Complaints of Possible Misconduct) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/Sea4550/documents/2042870. Veile Decl. ¶ 180 & Ex. 177.

299. Seattle Police Manual 5.210 (Law Enforcement Flying Armed) is available at https://public.powerdms.com/Sea4550/documents/2042878. Veile Decl. ¶ 181 & Ex. 178.

300. Off. Dir. Nat. Intelligence Sec. Executive Agent Dir. 4 (National Security Adjudicative Guidelines) is available at https://archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/SEAD-4-Adjudicative-Guidelines-U.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 182 & Ex. 179.

301. A DOJ Office of the Inspector General Memo dated August 14, 2026 and titled "Principles of Effective Oversight of the DOJ" is available at https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/2026-08/PrinciplesofEffectiveOversightoftheDepartmentofJustice_508.pdf. Veile Decl. ¶ 183 & Ex. 180.

302. Dep't of Interior Dep't Manual 446-22 (Electronic Control Devices) is available at https://www.doi.gov/document-library/departmental-manual/446-dm-22-electronic-control-devices. Veile Decl. ¶ 184 & Ex. 181.

VI. Public Oversight and Debate Over Other Law Enforcement Policies

303. On July 24, 2020, WUSA9 published an article titled "Police departments struggle with updating use of force policies, while some officers push back" (the WUSA9 Article). Veile Decl. ¶ 111 & Ex. 108.

304. The WUSA9 Article described "[c]alls for police reform" in the D.C. area, including reforms to policies for "how officers use force against citizens." *Id.*

305. The WUSA9 Article stated "WUSA9 reviewed the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department's use of force policy and found references to 'de-escalation techniques,' but no explanation for what those tactics should look like. MPD does instruct officers to intervene and report use of excessive force by fellow officers." *Id.*

306. On September 16, 2020, the Associated Press published an article titled "Across US, police officers abuse confidential databases" ("AP Confidential Databases Article"). Veile Decl. ¶ 194 & Ex. 194.

307. The AP Confidential Databases Article stated that "[p]olice officers across the country misuse confidential law enforcement databases to get information on romantic partners, business associates, neighbors, journalists and others for reasons that have nothing to do with daily police work, an Associated Press investigation has found." *Id.*

308. The AP Confidential Databases Article stated that "[l]aw enforcement officials have taken steps to try to limit abuse, though they say they know of no foolproof safeguard given the volume of inquiries and the need for officers to have information at their fingertips." *Id.*

309. For instance, the AP Confidential Databases Article stated that "[i]n Florida, a memorandum of understanding this year increased the amount of field audits law enforcement agencies must undergo regarding DAVID usage. Troopers in the Florida Highway Patrol sign usage warnings when they access the DAVID system and a criminal sanctions acknowledgment. Users are audited and instructed to select a reason for a search before making inquiries." *Id.*

310. The AP Confidential Databases Article also stated that the Miami-Dade police department "now does quarterly audits in which officers can be randomly asked to explain searches." *Id.*

311. On April 19, 2021, the Associated Press published an article titled "NYPD agrees to limits on sound cannons, ending 5-year battle," regarding the NYPD's "use of sound cannons, formerly known as Long Range Acoustic Devices" (the "AP LRAD Article"). Veile Decl. ¶ 190 & Ex. 187.

312. The AP LRAD Article stated that "[t]he New York Police Department has agreed to limit its use of sound cannons on crowds, ending a five-year legal battle over claims that the devices caused hearing damage, dizziness and migraines." *Id.*

313. The AP LRAD Article further stated that "[i]n a settlement agreement filed in federal court on Monday, the police department said it will no longer use an 'alert tone' setting in which the devices emit a series of sharp, painful beeps to disperse crowds." *Id.*; *see also* Stipulation of Settlement, *Edrei v. City of New York*, No. 1:16-cv-01652 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021) Dkt. No. 144.

314. The AP LRAD Article further stated that "[a]mong other changes, officers must get authorization from a supervisor, department lawyer or the commanding officer of the disorder control unit before using the devices, and all uses must be tracked in a log." Veile Decl. Ex. 187; *see also* Stipulation of Settlement, *Edrei*, No. 1:16-cv-01652, Dkt. No. 144.

315. On February 11, 2025, news outlet WTTW published an article titled "Reform Groups say CPD's New Plan to Stop and Search Chicagoans Violates Constitution, Consent Decree," (the "WTTW Article"). Veile Decl. ¶ 113 & Ex. 110.

316. The WTTW Article stated that "[n]ew rules designed to limit when Chicago police officers can stop and search Chicagoans violate the U.S. Constitution by allowing officers to stop and frisk people based on their race or ethnicity, a coalition of reform groups told the federal judge overseeing efforts to reform the Chicago Police Department." *Id.*

317. The WTTW Article stated that the proposed new policy prohibited "officers from conducting investigatory stops or protective pat-downs 'based solely on a person's race, ethnicity, color, national origin, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, immigration status, homeless status, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, financial status, or

lawful source of income, without any other specific and articulable facts that the person is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.'" *Id.*

318. The WTTW Article stated that the "coalition of reform groups" sent a letter to the City of Chicago, and contained the following quote from that letter: "The phrase 'based solely on' permits CPD to make unconstitutional stops and frisks that are motivated – even in part – by a person's race or ethnicity' . . . The 'solely' modifier must be deleted." *Id.*

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Respectfully Submitted,

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