*Latest Developments
Recent changes in state anti-SLAPP laws
Recent legislation has trended toward more robust protections for defendants in SLAPP suits.
South Dakota became the sixteenth state to enact a version of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (“UPEPA”) in March 2026. The Uniform Law Commission drafted UPEPA as a model law designed to prevent abusive litigation, known as strategic lawsuits against public participation or “SLAPPs,” aimed at silencing free speech through meritless defamation, privacy, or other nuisance claims.
Michigan became the fifteenth state to enact a version of UPEPA in October 2025.
Delaware became the fourteenth state to enact a version of UPEPA in September 2025.
Montana and Iowa became the twelfth and thirteenth states, respectively, to enact a version of UPEPA in May 2025.
Idaho became the eleventh state to enact a version of UPEPA in March 2025; its law will go into effect January 1, 2026.
Ohio became the tenth state to enact a version of UPEPA in January 2025.
Pennsylvania amended its anti-SLAPP law in July 2024, becoming the ninth state to enact a version of the UPEPA.
Minnesota amended its anti-SLAPP law in May 2024, becoming the eighth state to enact a version of the UPEPA.
Arizona amended its anti-SLAPP law in May 2022 to protect all lawful exercises of First Amendment rights, including the rights of free speech and free press. The amendments marked a substantial expansion of the law’s scope, which previously protected only against SLAPP suits brought in retaliation for the exercise of one’s right to petition the government.
In April 2022, Kentucky became the second state to enact a version of UPEPA.
In May 2021, Washington became the first state to pass a version of UPEPA. Washington previously adopted an anti-SLAPP law in 2010, but the state supreme court struck it down in 2015, finding that it violated the state constitutional right to a trial by jury, by authorizing judges to adjudicate factual questions in non-frivolous cases before trial. The new law avoids this problem by adopting language that tracks the existing summary judgment and dismissal standards. It thus essentially allows defendants to bring motions for summary judgment much earlier in the proceedings rather than after a lengthy and expensive discovery period.
In November 2020, New York significantly expanded its anti-SLAPP law, which had previously only covered cases brought by plaintiffs seeking public permits, zoning changes, or other entitlements from a government body. The 2020 amendments broadened the anti-SLAPP law to cover cases involving “any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest” or “any other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest . . . .” N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 76-a(1)(a)(1)-(2) (McKinney).
Colorado adopted anti-SLAPP protections in 2019. The law allows a defendant to file a special motion to dismiss claims arising from the exercise of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101(3)(a) (2019).
Tennessee significantly improved its anti-SLAPP protections in 2019 to protect people from lawsuits “filed in response to [their] exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-104(a) (2019). The law permits defendants to file a motion to dismiss a SLAPP suit before the costly discovery process begins, immediately appeal the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and recover attorney’s fees if a court rules in their favor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-104 (2019). Previously, Tennessee’s anti-SLAPP law only protected statements made to governmental agencies. § 4-21-1003.
Virginia has amended its anti-SLAPP law several times since 2017. As currently enacted, the law creates immunity from tort liability for statements made regarding “matters of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment.” When a lawsuit is dismissed or a subpoena is quashed under the statute, the defendant “may” be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. However, unlike most anti-SLAPP laws, the Virginia law still fails to identify any special procedures allowing a defendant to invoke these protections at an early stage of the proceedings.
Not all changes in recent years have strengthened anti-SLAPP protections. In 2019, Texas amended its anti-SLAPP law to limit the types of statements that could receive protection. While the previous version of the Texas law allowed defendants to seek dismissal of lawsuits broadly “related to” a person’s exercise of the right of free speech, petition, or association, the new statute requires the claim to be more narrowly “based on” or “in response to” the exercise of one of those rights. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 27.003(a) (2019). The 2019 amendments also significantly expanded the statute’s list of exemptions, including a new carve-out for legal actions arising from employment and independent contractor relationships that seek recovery for misappropriation of trade secrets or corporate opportunities—potentially allowing employers to pursue such claims against employees without the threat of an anti-SLAPP motion. Efforts to further weaken the law in the 2023 and 2025 legislative sessions did not succeed.
Courts disagree on whether anti-SLAPP protections apply in federal court
If a plaintiff sues a journalist in federal court for a state law tort, such as libel, it is not always clear whether the journalist can invoke the protections of the state’s anti-SLAPP law, assuming one exists. Congress has never passed a federal anti-SLAPP law, and courts across the country disagree about whether state anti-SLAPP provisions apply in federal court. The analysis turns on whether a state’s anti-SLAPP law creates substantive rights and does not conflict with federal rules. Some federal courts of appeals have found both requirements satisfied and allowed defendants to invoke these protections in federal court. See, e.g., Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding application of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP provisions in federal court “unproblematic”); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that Maine’s anti-SLAPP law applied in federal court); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying certain provisions of the California anti-SLAPP law in federal court).
But other federal appellate courts, particularly in recent years, have disagreed. See, e.g., La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that California’s anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in federal court because it conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, and overruling the court’s earlier decision in Liberty Synergistics); Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 29, 2019) (finding that Texas anti-SLAPP law’s burden-shifting framework could not apply in federal court because it imposed additional requirements beyond those found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that motion-to-strike procedure in Georgia anti-SLAPP law conflicted with federal rules and could not apply in federal court); Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 662 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 591 (2018) (finding that New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP law does not apply in federal court); Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding that D.C. anti-SLAPP law does not apply in federal court).
The future of California’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court is now particularly unsettled. The Ninth Circuit has long held that the statute applies in federal diversity cases, see CoreCivic, Inc. v. Candide Group, LLC, 46 F.4th 1136 (9th Cir. 2022), but that position has been significantly eroded. Most recently, in Gopher Media LLC v. Melone, 154 F.4th696 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), an eleven-judge en banc panel unanimously held that denials of California anti-SLAPP motions are no longer immediately appealable in federal court under the collateral order doctrine, overruling the court’s 2003 decision in Batzel v. Smith. The panel assumed—without deciding—that the statute continues to apply in federal diversity cases. However, six judges wrote separately in dueling concurrences to debate the broader question, with four judges urging the Ninth Circuit to join the Second, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits and hold that the anti-SLAPP statute is entirely inapplicable in federal court. The question of whether California’s anti-SLAPP law will continue to apply in Ninth Circuit federal courts thus remains open and may be resolved in future proceedings.
The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the applicability of state anti-SLAPP laws in federal court.