3. Fee issues

Alabama has no provision for administratively appealing denials of access to public records.

While the regulations do not specifically address appeals or requests for reconsideration to an agency head concerning fees or issues other than denial of requests for public records, there is no apparent reason why any such collateral issues could not be raised in this manner. In addition, the Public Records Act provides that the fees established by a public agency in the executive branch (except the fees of the University of Alaska and the Alaska Railroad Corporation) for providing electronic services and products under AS 40.25.115 may be canceled by the governor, if the governor determines that the fees are unreasonably high. AS 40.25.115(g). Pursuant to this, the administrative regulations provide that a requester seeking electronic services and products may ask for a review of public agency's fees for those services and products. Upon request from the Office of the Governor, a public agency providing those services and products must provide the assumptions and documentation of the costs and the rate formulas used to calculate its fees for electronic services and products. In reviewing the fees, the Office of the Governor shall determine and find in writing whether the fees comply with the statute and regulations, and provide a decision to the requester and the public agency within 60 working days, explaining the Office 's determinations, and including, in the Office's discretion, instructions to the public agency regarding fees. 2 AAC 96.460(g). A fee reduction or an instruction that the Office of the Governor provides to a public agency is effective immediately unless the Office of the Governor acts to impose a later deadline or regulations are required to implement those reductions or instructions. 2 AAC 96.460(h).

In Copeland v. Ballard, 210 P.3d 1197 (Alaska 2009), appellants Tom Copeland and Riki Ott sought access to the administrative record in an appeal from a decision of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) in favor of shipping entities concerning DEC approved oil discharge contingency plans. The Alaska Supreme Court held DEC violated intervenor appellants Copeland and Ott’s due process rights under Alaska Const. art. I, §7, by predicating their request for relevant records on completion of those records by the agency, and by dismissing them from the appeal when they did not pay preparation costs for the agency's record. The DEC argued that because a regulation requiring the agency to notify parties that they could have access to the record when it had been certified as complete, it was clear that Copeland and Ott could not access have access to the record before it was certified. Copeland and Ott argue that this regulation, made applicable through AS 40.25.122, unconstitutionally denied them access in violation of their due process rights. The Supreme Court agreed with Copeland and Ott that the DEC violated the due process clause of the state constitution by dismissing them from the administrative appeal, and in denying the residents' request for access to the record. It found they had a strong interest in accessing the record, and that DEC had offered no valid governmental interest in denying access. The agency also erred by not explaining its calculations for preparation costs. The Supreme Court also concluded that the dismissal of the residents was an abuse of discretion because the agency easily could have reinstated the residents once they submitted payment for the record, and because there was neither prejudice nor evidence of willfulness on the Copeland and Ott's part. The court found that the regulation's effect was to prevent access to the record prior to certification. It found that, as litigants, Copeland and Ott had a strong interest in accessing the record—that it was not only “the platform upon which they must build their case,” but also that access to the record was important to facilitate the parties’ attempt to negotiate a limited record for review in order to control costs. The court said none of DEC’s asserted justifications constituted valid governmental interests in denying access, and questioned the government’s interest in placing “any burden whatsoever on accessing the record.” This case is noteworthy as a rare instance of the Court treating denial of access to records as a constitutional violation.

(This section is blank. See the point above.)

Because there is no administrative appeal, any claims regarding fees charged for records would be filed in the same court as discussed in V.C.2, supra.

Not applicable.

There are no specific provisions or reported court decisions discussing fee issues on appeal to the FOIC. See Records Outline at 1.D.

(This section is blank. See the point above.)

There is no specific provision regarding the appeal of fees. The language of D.C. Code § 2-537(a) — "[a]ny person denied the right to inspect a public record of a public body may petition the Mayor . . ." — may give a requester room to argue that his or her "right to inspect a public record" has been effectively denied by the imposition of an unaffordably high fee.

The Act does not require or otherwise provide for administrative appeals.

OIP does provide guidance on fee issues (see, e.g., http://oip.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/GUIDANCE-Waiver-of-Fees-in-the-Publlic-Interest.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) although advisory opinions of the Attorney General, Ombudsman, and the OIP are not themselves enforceable.

Not applicable.

This same procedure is used where the requester believes that an onerous fee is being imposed in order to discourage the request. This is clear under 5 ILCS 140/6(d), which states that the purposeful imposition of a fee not consistent with the [fee provisions of the Act] shall be considered a denial of access to public records for the purposes of judicial review. 5 ILCS 140/6(d).

There are no fees for filing a complaint with the Public Access Counselor.

Issues involving damages, injunctive relief, costs and fees heard at same time as claim of denial.

Any person requesting records may appeal the reasonableness of the fees charged for providing access to or furnishing copies of such records to the Secretary of Administration whose decision shall be final. K.S.A. 45-219(c)(5).

If a requester believes the agency is charging excessive fees, the requester may complain in writing to the Attorney General. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.880(4).

The Act does not provide for administrative appeal.

As of July 2022, the Public Access Ombudsman may mediate disputes over a wide range of issues, including the amount of fees (regardless of amount) and the denial of a fee waiver. GP § 4-1B-04(a); PIA Manual, at 5-5. The PIA Compliance Board, however, only has jurisdiction over complaints alleging unreasonable fees in excess of $350 and cannot hear disputes regarding fee waivers. GP § 4-1A-04(a)(1).

The Supervisor of Public Records may make determinations regarding fees.

A party requesting a Commissioner’s Opinion must pay a $200 fee. Minn. Stat. §13.072, subd. 1(b). Those filing a complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings must submit either a $1,000 filing fee, or a bond guaranteeing payment of the fee. Minn. Stat. §13.085, subd. 2(c).

None to file complaint with Ethics Commission.

A challenge to a failure to adhere to the Sunshine Law is to be brought in the circuit court for the county in which the governmental body has its principal place of business. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.027.1. Courts will address fee issues. See, e.g., R.L. Polk & Co. v. Missouri Dept. of Revenue, 309 S.W.3d 881 (Mo.Ct.App. 2010).

There is no method for resolving fee issues short of district court action.

None specified.

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 provides that “[a] requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

The court shall award damages, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to any person whose written request has been denied and is successful in a court action to enforce the provisions of the Inspection of Public Records Act. NMSA 1978 § 14-2-12.

With respect to administrative appeals, the FOIL only expressly provides for appeal of a denial of access to records. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89(4)(a). However, fee amounts are appealable in the same manner. See Op. Comm’r Ed. Dep’t, 18 Ed. Dep’t Rep. 276 (1979).

“[I]f anyone requesting public information from any public agency is charged a fee that the requester believes to be unfair or unreasonable, the requester may ask the State Chief information officer or his designee to mediate the dispute.” G.S. 132-6.2(b). See section above regarding “special service charges.”

If the attorney general issues a written opinion concluding that a violation has occurred, the public entity fails to take required action within a seven-day period, and the person who requested the opinion prevails in a civil action brought under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2, the requestor must be awarded costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney’s fees in the action and on appeal.

Not applicable.

There is no need to address fee issues.

The Law provides for an award of court costs and attorneys’ fees to agencies and requesters in certain situations specified in the Law depending on whether the court reversed the OOR’s determination. 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 67.1304(a). A court may also award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of litigation if the court finds that the legal challenge was frivolous. Id. § 67.1304(b). Nothing in the Law prohibits a court from imposing penalties and costs in accordance with applicable rules of the court. Id. § 67.1304(c).

Presumably the same provisions apply.

Not applicable in South Carolina.

No provision.

Presumably the chief administrative officer could determine the reasonableness of duplication fees.

Although attorneys’ fees are provided for if a requesting party substantially prevails in a court action, there is no statutory provision for fees in the administrative appeal.

(This section is blank. See the point above.)

If a requester prevails “in whole or in substantial part” in a mandamus action seeking access to a record, the requester is entitled to recover from the authority his or her attorney fees and costs. Wis. Stat. § 19.37(2); see Journal Times v. City of Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Comm’rs, 2015 WI 56, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563 (discussion of what constitutes “substantial part”).