7. Others

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Grand Juries: The CPRA does not apply to grand juries because it specifically excludes judicial agencies established by article VI of the California Constitution. Although grand juries are not specifically mentioned in article VI, the nature of the grand jury as a judicial entity and the important public interest requiring that its proceedings be conducted in secrecy are persuasive indications that the Legislature intended the grand jury to be excluded, as are the courts, from the CPRA's provisions. McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1162, 245 Cal. Rptr. 774, 751 P.2d 1329 (1988).

The constitutional Sunshine Amendment arguably does apply to grand juries because it applies generally to the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies. Cal. Const. art. I, § 3(b)(1). However, because the Sunshine Amendment expressly maintains pre-existing constitutional and statutory exemptions to the right of access to public records (see Cal. Const. art. I, § 3(b)(5)) and because the Legislature has enumerated several Penal Code provisions governing the secrecy of grand jury proceedings (see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 915, 924.1, 924.2, 939), it is doubtful that the Amendment provides any new access rights to records of the grand jury.

In cases where an indictment has been returned, existing statutory law provides that the public is entitled to transcripts of grand jury proceedings 10 days after delivery of the transcript to the defendant or his or her counsel unless, upon motion, it is determined that a reasonable likelihood exists that public disclosure may prejudice defendant's fair trial rights. Cal. Penal Code § 938.1(b).

Jury Commissioner: The CPRA also does not apply to the jury commissioner since the commissioner is an executive officer appointed by the superior court and therefore part of the judicial system. Pantos v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 258, 262, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1984). The constitutional Sunshine Amendment does apply to the jury commissioner because it applies generally to the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies without exception for the judicial branch of government. Cal. Const. art. I, § 3(b)(1); see Sander v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 4th 300, 309, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250, 314 P.3d 488 (2013) (recognizing application of Sunshine Amendment to judicial branch entities). However, the Sunshine Amendment expressly maintains pre-existing constitutional and statutory exemptions to the right of access to public records. Id. § 3(b)(5). Whether statutory law that provides for sealing of trial juror identifying information upon recording of a jury's verdict is such a statutory exemption is unclear given the provision for access upon a showing of good cause. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 237(a)(2). Arguably, access to juror questionnaires completed to determine juror qualification, pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code Section 205, for inclusion on the master list of qualified jurors may be accessible under the Amendment. No statute exists prohibiting their public disclosure (though one limits their use, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 205(b)), and previous case law holding that disclosure violated reasonable expectations of privacy did so on the particular facts of the case and in light of assurances of confidentiality provided by the court. Pantos, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 264.

Other documents held by the jury commissioner such as the master list of qualified jurors (identifying prospective jurors by name and address) and the jury summons list, which is a list of prospective or qualified jurors who are summoned to appear or to be available for jury service, are accessible court records under existing constitutional, statutory and common law. Id. at 262-63 (citing constitutional and statutory authority for access to court records and holding master list and summons list are public documents subject to public inspection); see also Alfaro v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 5th 371, 386, 272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404 (2020).

Homeowners' Associations: These are not governmental agencies and they are neither a state or local agency or a subdivision thereof. Thus, they are not subject to the CPRA.

Pursuant to House Bill 1041 (2004), fundraising and expenditure records of the University of Colorado Foundation are subject to public inspection.

1. The Division of Criminal Justice is subject to FOIA, but only with respect to its “administrative functions;” it is not otherwise deemed a public agency. Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-201.
2. Gen. Stat. §1-200(1) states that any committee “created by” a public agency is itself a public agency. This amendment in 1993 effectively reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Elections Review Comm. of the Eighth Utilities District v. FOIC, 219 Conn. 685, 595 A. 2d 313 (1991). In Gould v. FOIC, 314 Conn. 802 (2014), the Supreme Court held that a teacher arbitration panel was not a committee of the Department of Education and therefore not a public agency.

 

3. The FOIC, on petition by a public agency contemplating creation of a committee composed entirely of individuals who are not members of the agency, may exempt the committee from compliance with FOIA. Conn. Gen. Stat. §1-202.
4. In Envirotest Sys. Corp. v. FOIC, 59 Conn. App. 753,  denied, 254 Conn. 951, 762 A.2d 900 (2000), the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff, a private corporation providing auto emissions testing for the public under a contract with the state, was not a public agency. The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff could be bifurcated and treated as a public agency for some purposes, but not others. Id.at 762 n.9. It held that where funds received from the government were “consideration for the services it provided pursuant to a contract,” the government funding prong of the Bd. of Trustees test was not met. Id. at 760.

Other bodies to which governmental or public functions are delegated are covered if they (i) are supported in whole or in part by any public funds; (ii) expend or disburse any public funds, including grants, gifts or other similar disbursals and distributions; or (iii) are impliedly or specifically charged by any other public official, body or agency to advise or to make reports, investigations or recommendations. 29 Del. C. § 10002(k).

For example, a committee appointed by a public body established by the General Assembly is now required to hold open meetings, which corrects a defect in the Act pointed out by the Delaware Supreme Court in Delaware Solid Waste Authority v. News-Journal Co., 480 A.2d 628 (Del. 1984).

Not specifically addressed.

The Act covers records transferred to private persons or entities by an agency for storage or future governmental use. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b)(1).

A nonprofit corporation that managed public, education, and government access television channels is not an “agency” subject to the UIPA. ‘Olelo: The Corporation For Community Television v. OIP, 116 Hawai‘i 337, 351, 173 P.3d 484, 498 (2007).

The Act prohibits public bodies from granting to any person or entity, whether by contract, license or otherwise, the exclusive right to access and disseminate any public record. See 5 ILCS 140/3(a).

The Act’s definition of a “public body” also includes state universities and colleges and school districts. See 5 ILCS 140/2(a).

The Illinois Attorney General has opined that local ethics commissions or ultimate jurisdictional authorities (the elected or appointed official or subsidiary body of a unit of local government or school district having the power to discipline a particular employee) are not exempt from disclosure under the Act.  See Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. 007 (1999).

“Public agenc[ies]” under the Access to Public Records Act is broad, including both governmental and nongovernmental entities. See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-2(q).

Courts may resolve whether or not an entity is a “public agency” when there is a question about the matter. See Perry Cnty. Dev. Corp. v. Kempf, 712 N.E.2d 1020, 1027 (Ind. App. 1999) (whether development corporation working closely with the county was a “public agency” under the Act was an issue appropriate for resolution by the trial court). The party seeking records has the burden of proving that an entity is a “public agency.” See Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Ass’n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. 1991).

Whether an entity is a “public agency” under the Access to Public Records Act has influenced Indiana courts’ analysis of what is a “government entity” under other acts. See Lane ex rel. Sharp v. Frankfort Cmty. Sch. Bldg. Trades Corp., 747 N.E.2d 1172, 1178 (Ind. App. 2001) (Building Trades Corporation’s exemption from Access to Public Records Act and Open Door Law on account of not being a “public agency” under those statutes was a relevant factor in the court’s determination that the Corporation also was not a “government entity” entitled to protections afforded to such entities by the Indiana Tort Claims Act and the Comparative Fault Act).

Records of public funds invested by private third-parties are public records. Iowa Code § 22.14.

"Every county and city governing body, council, school district board, special district board and municipal corporation" is a public agency under the Kentucky Open Records Act. Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.870(d).

"Every state or local government agency, including the policymaking board of an institution of education, created by or pursuant to state or local statute, executive order, ordinance, resolution or other legislative act" is a public agency under the Kentucky Open Records Act. Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.870(f).

The Third Circuit offered an interesting dictum in Burkett v. UDS Management Corp., 741 So.2d 838 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 748 So.2d 1150 (La. 1999). While the case involved public records in the hands of a contracted private corporation, the court observed that "UDS argues that because no Louisiana Court has ever held the records of a private corporation to be subject to public inspection, this court may not now do so. However, we find no statutory or jurisprudential prohibition of such an order, if other factors allowing inspection are present." In Burkett, the court ordered records of a public body Water District in the possession of a private management company to be produced. Id.

In Community Press, LLC v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 2012 WL 601880, (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/10/12), the Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment that had held that a private company that, by contract, performed “virtually all functions of the city government,” was not subject to the Public Records Act.  While agreeing with the lower court that the private company was not a “branch, department, agency, political subdivision or governing authority,” the Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether public funding of, or the performance of governmental functions by, the private company brought it within the Public Records Act. In CII Carbon v. St. Blanc, 764 So.2d 1229 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000), however, the court held that data in the possession of a regulated utility that the Louisiana Public Service Commission had access to but had never had in its possession was not a "public record" under the Act.

The FOAA applies to Indian Tribes within the state unless engaged in purely internal tribal matters, such as in the deliberative process of self-government. Great Northern Paper v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, 770 A.2d 574.

There is no statutory or case law addressing additional entities beyond those already enumerated.

A private university’s police department is required (not by the Public Records Law but by G.L. c. 41, § 98F) to “make, keep and maintain a daily log … recording … all responses to valid complaints received, crimes reported, the names [and] addresses of persons arrested and the charges against such persons arrested,” and those logs shall be deemed public records.  Id.; 445 Mass. at 754, 840 N.E.2d at 525 (2006).  That obligation adheres even though such a private police department is not a governmental entity under the law.  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., 445 Mass. 745, 749, 840 N.E.2d 518, 522 (2006).

N/A.

A fire protection district is covered. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-91, March 5, 2004 to Schwartz. Sewer district is covered. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-170, April 16, 2004 to Cobb.

Any record, survey, memorandum or other document or study prepared and presented to a public governmental body by a consultant or other professional service paid for in whole or in part by public funds is a public record subject to disclosure under the Sunshine Law. This includes records created or maintained by a private contractor under an agreement with or on behalf of a public governmental body. Records prepared for a public governmental body by a consultant shall be retained by the body in the same manner as any other public record. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 610.010(6).

In Bryan v. Yellowstone Co. Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 312 Mont. 257, 60 P.3d 381 (2002) the Montana Supreme Court held that a committee created by a school district to research a proposition and submit a recommendation to the school board was a public or governmental body subject to the right to know provision of the Montana Constitution and held the documents submitted by the committee were public documents subject to disclosure; see also Goldstein v. Commission on Practice of Supreme Court, 297 Mont. 493, 995 P.2d 923 (2000) (Montana Supreme Court held that confidentiality provisions of Rules on Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement did not violate an attorneys' right to know or right to participate in government decisions by excluding attorney from the deliberations of Commission on Practice following the filing of formal complaint and held that Commission was not subject to open meeting requirements and sat in only advisory capacity to Supreme Court).

Other subunits of state or local government must maintain public records to the extent they fit the definition in Neb. Rev. Stat. §84-712.01(1), which provides that the term "public records" "shall include all records and documents, regardless of physical form, of or belonging to . . . any agency, branch, department, board, bureau, commission, council, subunit, or committee of any of the foregoing," unless any other statute expressly provides that particular records shall not be made public.

The NPRA’s scope has not been extended beyond the definitions of NRS 239.005.

The use of a public record in connection with a criminal investigation or the gathering of criminal intelligence shall not affect its status as a public record. G.S. § 132-1.4(f). Thus, public records in the possession of law enforcement should still be subject to public access.

Records kept by any "public office" are public records and subject to mandatory disclosure. Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(A)(1). "Public office" is defined as including "any state agency, public institution, political subdivision, or other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government." Ohio Rev. Code § 149.011(A).

Where an organization or entity is not obviously a "public office," the key to determining whether any of its records must be released is to apply either the functional-equivalency test or the Mazzaro delegation test. E.g., State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. Of Comm’s, 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625.

If they have a connection with the transaction of public business, the expenditure of public funds or the administering of public property, they are covered under the Act. 51 O.S. § 24A.3(2).

The Attorney General has taken the position that the Public Records Law may be used to obtain records of a private entity that contracts with a public body but is not the functional equivalent of a public body if the public body has custody of the documents; the Attorney General has also opined that records owned by a public body but in custody of a private entity are also obtainable. See Attorney General's Manual, § I.B.2.

None other than those identified infra.

All regulatory and administrative bodies, and school, fire, and water districts are expressly subject to the APRA.  R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2(1) (2012).

None

The records of any association or nonprofit corporations established for the benefit of local governmental entities or as a municipal bond financing pool, who receive government funding amounting to at least 30 percent of their income, and who are authorized to allow their employees to participate in the state retirement system are subject to the Act. T.C.A. § 10-7-503(d)(1). See Fodness v. Newport and Cocke County, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2004). However, this section of this statute also allows such organization to exempt themselves from the Act if they meet certain criteria.

The Act applies to property owners' associations in the same manner as a governmental body if:
1. membership in the property owners' association is mandatory for owners or a defined class of owners of private real property in a defined geographic area in a county with a population of 2.8 million or more or in a county adjacent to a county with a population of 2.8 million or more;
2. the property owners' association has the power to make mandatory special assessments for capital improvements or mandatory regular assessments; and
3. the amount of the mandatory special or regular assessments is or has ever been based in whole or in part on the value at which the state or a local governmental body assesses the property for purposes of ad valorem taxation under Section 20, Article VIII, Texas Constitution. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.0036.

GRAMA also applies to “any state-funded institution of higher education or public education,” Utah Code § 63G-2-103(11)(a)(iv), and to any political subdivision of the state that has not adopted its own information access rules by policy or by ordinance. See id. § 63G-2-103(11)(a)(v). It should be noted, however, that those political subdivisions that do adopt information access policies or ordinances must ensure that such policies or ordinances comply with GRAMA’s substantive classification and access provisions. See id. § 63G-2-701(2)(b).

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A quasi-private foundation established by statute to conduct fundraising activities ancillary to the operations of a public university did not qualify as a public body under the Act.  Transparent GMU v. George Mason University, 298 Va. 222, 835 S.E.2d 544 (2019).

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Appointed bodies are included. A nonprofit humane society keeping records of dog impoundments pursuant to a delegated statutory duty is required to make those records public. State ex rel. Schultz v. Wellens, 208 Wis. 2d 574, 579, 561 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (“[I]t would be ironic to construe the Open Records Law to preclude public access to statutorily designated ‘public record[s]’ of a society designated by a county board to impound and dispose of dogs.”).

Any records determined to be official public records or office files and memoranda will be subject to the Act. Wyo. Stat. § 16-4-201(a)(vi) (1977, Rev. 1982); Wyo. Stat. § 9-2-405 (1977, Rev. 1987).