B. Pretrial proceedings
The First Amendment guarantees the right of the press and the public to attend “certain preliminary proceedings in criminal cases.” United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998). The right extends to those “pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases which historically have been, and logically should be, open to the public.” United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (“McVeigh II”).
In McVeigh II, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged without deciding that the constitutional right of access likely extends to suppression hearings and accompanying motions under the Supreme Court’s Press-Enterprise II analysis. Id. at 813.
As to pre-trial proceedings, the Second Circuit has held that they merit a degree of First Amendment protection. See United States v. Klepfer, 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984). In Klepfer, the court reviewed an order closing a courtroom during a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress and ruled that the lower court had not sufficiently articulated a basis for its serious concern over public dissemination risks and for its preference for closure over alternative remedies. See also Application of Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We therefore agree with the Third and Ninth Circuits that the First Amendment extends some degree of public access to a pretrial suppression hearing.").
A more definitive rule was issued by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 1, which concerned a motion by members of news media to gain access to transcripts of preliminary hearing in criminal prosecution. The court reviewed a determination of the Supreme Court of California that had determined that the right of access to criminal proceedings recognized in Press–Enterprise I extended only to criminal trials and therefore that there was no general right of access to preliminary hearings. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating, " “the qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary proceedings as they are conducted in California ...the proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 13-14.
The public’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings extends to preliminary hearings held to determine whether there is probable cause to go to trial, plea hearings, sentencing hearings, suppression hearings and bail hearings. See In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
The public’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings extends to motions to transfer venue. See In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d. 850 (4th Cir. 1989).
The public has no right of access to proceedings and records relating to the issuance of a search warrant before the warrant is executed, including an order sealing such proceedings and records. After execution, the public has a common law, but not a First Amendment, right of access to affidavits in support of search warrants, which right may be overcome by law enforcement’s interest in protecting ongoing investigations. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989); Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v. Buchanan, 417 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2005); Washington Post v. Hughes, 923 F2d 324 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Fifth Circuit has noted that the presumption of openness and the right to a public trial are not limited to issues that arise after a jury is sworn or times when the jury is present. Rovinsky v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1984). The presumption applies at least to those pretrial hearings and other proceedings that are an integral part of the trial, such as jury selection and motions to suppress evidence. Id. Openness is vital to the criminal justice system because it encourages witnesses to come forward, discourages perjury, insures that the judge and prosecutor act responsibly, and lends credibility by allowing the public to see that an accused is dealt with fairly. These objectives are frustrated if pre-trial hearings are closed. United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1986). A pre-trial hearing can thus generally be closed to the public only if it satisfies the First Amendment tests set out in Press-Enterprise: i.e. that there is an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced if the proceeding is not closed and that the closure is no broader than necessary to protect the interest, and that reasonable alternatives to closure have been considered and found wanting. United States v. De Los Santos, 810 F.2d 1326, 1333 (5th Cir. 1987).
Limitations on public attendance may be imposed so long as they are no more exclusive than necessary to protect a state interest that outweighs the defendant’s interest in public scrutiny of the proceedings. Rovinsky v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1984). The right to a public trial does not turn on whether a hearing is examining an issue that is factual or doctrinal, substantive or procedural, but rather on the relationship of the issue to the merits of the underlying charge, the outcome of the prosecution, and the integrity of the administration of justice. Id. at 201. But no government interest can sustain the exclusion of the press and public from a trial or pre-trial proceeding absent findings of necessity articulated on the record. Id.
In order to achieve total closure, (1) a party must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closure; and (4) the court must make findings adequate to support closure. United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995).
Partial closure (allowing some spectators in the courtroom) does not raise the same concerns that total closure raises since at least some audience remains to observe the fairness of the proceedings. Therefore, for partial closure (evicting some members of the audience, for example) a court must only find a “substantial reason” for the closure. United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995).
However, the right of access to some pre-trial hearings, such as a bail hearing, is not as strong as the right of access to the trial itself. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 364 (5th Cir. 1983). Closure of a pre-trial bail hearing is thus permissible if the defendant shows that (1) his right to a fair trial will likely be prejudiced by conducting the hearing in public; (2) alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect his fair trial right; and (3) closure will probably be effective in protecting against the perceived danger. Id.
Meanwhile, not all aspects of trials or pre-trial hearings are considered public property. Private “sidebar” conferences about technical legal matters, whether pre-trial or during trial, do not violate the right to a public trial, nor do they violate the press and public’s right to observe and attend a trial. Rovinsky v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1984).
“The right of access to criminal trials includes a right of access to the voir dire examination of potential jurors in a criminal trial. . . . Press-Enterprise declared that ‘closed proceedings . . . must be rare.’” United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819 (1984)); United States v. Danovaro, 877 F.2d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[t]rials and pre-trial hearings are open to the public under the First Amendment, unless some extraordinary circumstance requires their closure”); United States v. Blagojevich, 662 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (First Amendment right of access includes voir dire “and trial-like preliminary hearings in criminal cases”); Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette v. Baker, 788 F. Supp. 379, 385 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (“The public and press have a ‘presumption of access’ to both criminal and civil court proceedings”; newspaper reporter had right to be present at state court guardianship hearing).
A pretrial hearing cannot be closed “just as a matter of discretion”; “the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984)).
See also N.D. Ind. Local Crim. R. 53-1(b) (“Ordinarily, preliminary proceedings (including preliminary examinations and hearings on pretrial motions) must be held in open court, with the public permitted to attend and observe. But the court may close preliminary proceedings if: (1) the law allows it; and (2) the court cites for the record the specific findings that make doing so necessary”).
The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that “the qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings described in Press-Enterprise II applies to pretrial hearings.” Ex parte Consol. Publ’g Co., 601 So. 2d 423, 433 (Ala. 1992) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986)); see also Ex parte Birmingham News Co., 624 So. 2d 1117, 1125 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (discussing application of the public’s right of access to pretrial proceedings generally, as recognized in Ex parte Consolidated Publishing Co.). Therefore, all pretrial proceedings in Alabama courts are presumptively open to the public, subject to the qualifications set forth in Press-Enterprise II and its progeny.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled in Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder, 281 Ark. 152, 157,662 S.W.2d 174, 175 (1983), that the presumption of openness also applies to pre-trial proceedings. For example, the court found that there was a presumption of public access during a suppression of evidence hearing. Shiras v. Britt, 267 Ark. 97, 589 S.W.2d 18 (1979).
Both the United States and Colorado constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that “criminal trials and pretrial proceedings should not be closed to media representatives unless an overriding and compelling state interest in closing the proceedings is demonstrated.” Star Journal Publ’g Corp. v. Cnty. Court, 591 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Colo. 1979). In Star Journal, the court held that a “judge may close a pretrial hearing only if (1) the dissemination of information would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial; and (2) the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative means.” Id.
In In re P.R. v. Dist. Court, 637 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1981), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the evidentiary phase of a contempt hearing, stemming from a witness’s refusal to answer questions before a grand jury, “may be closed only upon express findings by the respondent court that: (1) a public hearing would create a clear and present danger to the investigation of matters presently pending before the statutory grand jury; and (2) the prejudicial effect of such information on presently pending grand jury matters cannot be avoided by any reasonable alternative less drastic than closure.” Id. at 353. The court clarified that a “finding of clear and present danger, by itself, does not constitute a warrant for an order of closure. Such a finding merely triggers the next level of inquiry—that is, whether reasonable and less drastic alternatives are available to the order of closure.” Id. at 354. The court held that the trial court’s “total closure of the evidentiary phase of the contempt hearing, without a finding of compelling necessity” violated the witness’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment “as well as the constitutional interest of the public and the media in attending a judicial proceeding which is the substantial equivalent of a trial” under both the First Amendment and Colorado Constitution. Id. at 354. The court also ruled, however, that the “court may hear in camera any testimony relative to the effect of a public hearing on the integrity of grand jury proceedings prior to its ruling on closure, the record of such hearing to be sealed for purposes of appellate review.” Id. The court made clear that “the burden is upon the party seeking closure to establish the factual basis for the application.” Id. at 353.
In dicta, the Colorado Supreme Court recently recognized that “presumptive access to judicial proceedings is a right recognized under both the state and federal constitutions,” but simultaneously declined to recognize a constitutional or common law right of access to criminal court records. People v. Owens, 2018 CO 55, ¶ 1, 420 P.3d 257, 257 (Colo. 2018); see also Stapleton v. Dist. Court, 499 P.2d 310, 311 (Colo. 1972) (declining to require the trial court to hold a pretrial suppression hearing closed to the public and news media); In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d 465, 467 (Colo. 1956) (discussing the importance of press access to courts and constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and public trials); Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48 ¶¶ 19–21, 386 P.3d 440, 447 (Márquez, J., dissenting) (discussing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) and the right of the public and press to attend trial and jury selection).
It is well established in Georgia that the public enjoys a clear and routine right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of Georgia has emphasized that the importance of openness in judicial proceedings applies with equal force to pretrial hearings finding that it “is often the most critical stage of a criminal proceedings,” regardless of whether such proceedings and records will bring to light potentially inadmissible evidence. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 578–79 (1982) (reversing the trial court’s exclusion of the press from pretrial hearings, including hearings on motions for change of venue, individual and sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors and admissibility of certain evidence in a murder trial). See also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (“The Supreme Court of Georgia was correct in assuming that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the voir dire of prospective jurors.”); State v. Brown, 293 Ga. 493 (2013) (quashing indictment not returned in open court).
In Kansas City Star Co. v. Fossey, 630 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1981), the Kansas Supreme Court made clear that a presumption of openness applies to pretrial proceedings. Standards on fair trials that the state supreme court adopted include reference to “a preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or any other pretrial proceeding, including a motion to suppress.” Fossey, 630 P.2d at 1182 (quoting The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice: Fair Trial and Free Press § 8-3.2 (2d ed. 1978)).
Likewise, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that there is a presumption of openness to pretrial criminal proceedings. “The preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's free trial rights.” Miss. Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Press Enterprise II); see also Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 864, 899 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding the trial court’s decision to restrict access to suppression hearing to protect the constitutional right of another defendant to a fair trial), rev'd on other grounds, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007).
New Mexico embraced the Supreme Court’s holding in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) that access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings. Further, preliminary proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating a “reasonable likelihood” exists that access would deprive defendant of a fair trial (lesser burden then the “substantial probability” test required by First Amendment). N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)). Finally, New Mexico follows the Supreme Court’s ruling in Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), to hold that pretrial publicity, even pervasive, adverse publicity, does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. See, e.g., State v. Vasquez, 2010-NMCA-041, ¶ 38, 148 N.M. 202, 213, 232 P.3d 438, 449 (citing State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 726, 819 P.2d 673, 676 (1991) (“Exposure of venire members to publicity about a case by itself does not establish prejudice.”).
New Mexico Rules support the common law tradition. Because “[a]ll courtroom proceedings shall be open to the public unless the courtroom is closed by an order of the court entered under this rule,” Rule 5-124(A) NMRA, it follows that pretrial proceedings are accessible to the public as well.
In Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986), the North Dakota Supreme Court has established the procedure to be followed by the trial court in considering a request for closure of a preliminary proceeding:
- Review the evidence independently and, if necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, privately, with counsel present and on the record.
- Consider possible alternatives to closure.
- If the court determines there is a substantial likelihood of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the closure may be ordered only to the extent necessary to protect that right.
- The court must make specific findings adequate to support closure.
The media may not directly intervene as a party in a motion for closure of a preliminary proceeding under N.D.C.C. § 29-07-14. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court held in Dickinson Newspapers v. Jorgensen, 338 N.D. 72 (N.D. 1983) that the news media can apply for a supervisory writ to prevent the closing of a preliminary hearing. However, an application for a writ of this nature must include the party requesting the closure (typically the criminal defendant) as a respondent.
In Oregon, the access guarantee of the constitution applies where the hearing in question is adjudicatory in nature. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. O’Leary 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (finding a law that required closure of summary hearings on motions to compel testimony unconstitutional); accord State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 913 n.4, 633 P.2d 831 (1981) (“[I]t is clear that in Oregon the provision of Article I, section 10, that ‘no court shall be secret,’ applies to all judicial proceedings.”).
However, Oregon courts have closed pretrial competency hearings for minors. State v. Romel, 57 Or. App. 372, 375, 644 P.2d 643 (1982). Oregon’s rape shield law has survived two challenges to its constitutionality under Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution. See State ex rel Davey v. Frankel, 312 Or. 286, 823 P.2d 394 (1991) (holding that a law requiring review to be “in chambers” does not necessarily exclude the public); State v. Blake, 53 Or. App. 906, 633 P.2d 831 (1981) (holding that a law excluding the public from hearings regarding sexual history was constitutional), review allowed 291 Or. 893, 642 P.2d 309, appeal dismissed 292 Or. 486, 640 P.2d 605 (dismissing appeal where the legislature enacted the law construed in Davey). Oregon’s current rape shield law, ORS 40.210, explicitly excludes the public from review of evidence of prior sexual history, and the Oregon Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in State v. Macbale, 353 Or. 789, 809, 305 P.3d 107, 119 (2013) (concluding that “a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence under [ORS 40.210] does not constitute an administration of justice for purposes of Article I, section 10, and that the legislature may provide that such a hearing be closed to the public”).
The public and press have a general right to access all parts of a criminal proceeding, including pretrial proceedings. Commonwealth v. Upshur, 924 A.2d 642, 649 n.6 (Pa. 2007).
Search warrant proceedings: The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the process for obtaining search warrants is closed to the public and is conducted ex parte. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 209-12. The Rules make clear that “[t]he issuing authority shall not make any search warrants and any affidavit(s) of probable cause available for public inspection or dissemination until the warrant has been executed.” Pa. R. Crim. P. 212(a). The Rules further provide that “[u]nexecuted warrants and the associated affidavits of probable cause are not public records and upon return to the issuing authority the unexecuted warrants and affidavit(s) shall be destroyed by the issuing authority.” Id. at 212(b). Once a search warrant is executed, the Rules set forth a procedure whereby the government can seek to seal the affidavit supporting the search warrant for “good cause.” Pa. R. Crim. P. 211.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has instructed that “a search warrant is a public judicial document.” PG Publ’g Co. v. Commonwealth, 614 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. 1992). Yet, “[t]he ex parte application for the issuance of a search warrant and the issuing authority’s consideration of the application are not subject to public scrutiny.” Id. And, while the Court noted in a case involving access to search warrant documents that “[t]here is no historical tradition of public access to search warrant proceedings,” it acknowledged that search warrant applications are filed with district justices and that those documents “upon which the district justice bases a decision to issue a search warrant are also judicial in character, for the decision to issue a search warrant is a judicial decision.” Id. Once a search warrant has been executed, the “need for secrecy will ordinarily expire.” Id.
Preliminary hearings: The preliminary hearing is an integral part of the criminal process and, thus, is subject to the presumption of openness. Before closing a preliminary hearing, the trial judge must consider the public’s right of access and alternative means of protecting any rights asserted by the defendant, and the court must articulate the reasons for closure and alternatives on the record. See In re Daily Item, 456 A.2d. 580, 582 (Pa. Super. 1983); see also Commonwealth v. Murray, 502 A.2d 624, 626, 629 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1985).
Suppression: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that access to pretrial suppression hearings is governed by the same standards as access to pretrial proceedings in general. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 387 A.2d 425, 434 (Pa. 1978); see also Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A.2d 318, 324 (Pa. 1980) (ruling that closure was improper because of the availability of a less restrictive alternative (i.e., sequestration of the jury)).
Depositions: There are no criminal cases reported in Pennsylvania that have dealt specifically with deposition proceedings. However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that in civil proceedings “access rights to litigation are at their nadir” during the discovery phase. Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 554 A.2d 954, 958 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984)). As a result, “there is no presumptive right to discovery material” in civil cases. Kurtzman v. Hankin, 714 A.2d 450, 452-53 (Pa. Super. 1998). Because depositions are performed during the discovery phase of litigation, it is likely that the presumptive right of access does not attach.
Preservation of Testimony Proceedings: Proceedings under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 500, which are held for the purposes of preserving the testimony of a witness in anticipation of a criminal trial, are not subject to a First Amendment right of access. See Commonwealth v. Selenski, 996 A.2d 494, 499 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that the right of access does not apply because such proceedings are akin to discovery depositions).
The Vermont Supreme Court has recognized that criminal trials historically have been open to the public in their entirety, “resulting in a strong presumption in favor of openness.” State v. Favreau, 173 Vt. 636, 638, 800 A.2d 472, 474 (Vt. 2002). Indeed, the Court “start[s] with the presumption that pretrial proceedings and documents are open to the public, closure being the exception rather than the rule.” State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 474, 537 A.2d 422, 427-28 (Vt. 1987) (holding that members of the public and news media have a right of access to pretrial suppression hearings under the First Amendment). “To rebut the presumption of openness, the party seeking closure must demonstrate ‘that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Herald Ass’n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 534, 419 A.2d 323, 326 (Vt. 1980) (“any pretrial closure order imposed in this jurisdiction must be based on a clear necessity for the protection of the defendant’s fair trial rights and must be limited in scope by its justification”). “Criminal proceedings may be closed to the public without violating First Amendment rights only if (1) closure serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a ‘substantial probability’ that, in the absence of closure, that compelling interest would be harmed; and (3) there are no alternatives to closure that would adequately protect that compelling interest.” State v. Densmore, 160 Vt. 131, 138, 624 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Vt. 1993).
The Vermont Supreme Court has applied the two-part test developed by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings attaches to a particular proceeding. State v. LaBounty, 167 Vt. 25, 29, 702 A.2d 82, 85 (Vt. 1997) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). Under this test, the qualified right attaches if, first, “the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public,” and second, “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” LaBounty, 167 Vt. at 29, 702 A.2d at 85.
“[T]he public’s interest in the conduct of the judicial system may be even more acute when pretrial hearings are involved,” as the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are resolved before trial. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 587, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1981).
Absent an overriding interest, pretrial hearings in criminal matters must be open to the public. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 622, 628, 570 S.E.2d 809, 812 (2002) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 585, 281 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1981)).
The public’s qualified right of access extends to suppression hearings. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 588, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (1981) (“We believe pretrial suppression hearings are as important to our criminal justice system as the trial itself, and to allow the public to view the trial without any knowledge of what has taken place previously would make the right of access granted in Richmond Newspapers a hollow one.”).
The Virginia Court of Appeals has held that the public has a qualified right of access to criminal competency hearings. See In re Times-World Corp., 25 Va. App. 405, 415, 488 S.E.2d 677, 682 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II), the United States Supreme Court held that the public’s qualified right of access extends to preliminary hearings held to determine whether there is probable cause to go to trial, as such hearings are “often the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding,” and “in many cases provide[ ] the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice system.” 478 U.S. at 12. For similar reasons, the Fourth Circuit has held that the public’s qualified right of access extends to plea hearings and sentencing. See In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[E]ven if plea hearings and sentencing hearings are not considered a part of the trial itself, they are surely as much an integral part of a criminal prosecution as are preliminary probable-cause hearings, suppression hearings, or bail hearings, all of which have been held to be subject to the public’s First Amendment right of access.”). The Supreme Court of Virginia has cited the Fourth Circuit’s decision approvingly. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 622, 628, 570 S.E.2d 809, 812 (2002) (citing In re Washington Post Co. for the proposition that “Under certain circumstances and with qualifications, [the public’s qualified right of access] extends to inspection of documents filed in connection with such proceedings.”).
See State ex rel. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. Gorenstein, 131 Wis. 2d 342, 388 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. App. 1986) (footnotes omitted):
It is clear that a trial court judge, in his or her discretion, may close the sitting of a court. Voir direof a jury panel, although a pretrial proceeding, has been held to be a sitting of the court. For a trial court to order closure, however, the reasons must be compelling, substantial, and “weighty and overwhelming.” Such reasons must be sufficient to overcome the presumption that a jury voir direwill be open to the public.
Cf. Stevens v. Manitowoc Cir. Ct., 141 Wis. 2d 239, 414 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1997):
Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Press-Enterprise II, which specifically addressed closure of a preliminary hearing, and the Court’s rationale in extending the sixth amendment public trial right in Waller, we hold that a preliminary examination is sufficiently analogous in the purposes and aims which support the public trial requirement that a qualified sixth amendment public trial right must adhere when closure is sought by the complainant under sec. 970.03(4), Stats. We therefore overrule that part of the holding of Kennon which concludes that a qualified right to a public preliminary examination is not constitutionally guaranteed.
. . .
Under the plain language of sec. 757.14, Stats., there is a presumption of openness which extends to “every citizen” for “the sittings of every court.” The statute makes no exception or special provision for members of the press, though in State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court, 65 Wis. 2d at 69, 221 N.W.2d at 895, this court held that a journalist may invoke the provisions of this statute as a citizen and a member of the public.
See also State v. Webb, 160 Wis. 2d 622, 467 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1991) (holding that trial court violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right by closing preliminary hearing, but fair and errorless trial cured defect); State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 124 Wis. 2d 499, 370 N.W.2d 209 (Wis. 1985) (Presumption of openness applies to a precomplaint hearing):
We hold that a section 968.02(3) hearing is subject to the same presumption of openness that applies to most judicial proceedings in Wisconsin. This is not based on a conclusion that such a hearing is a “sitting of the court” within the meaning of section 757.14. … Rather, the presumption of openness here is based upon other factors.